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Abstract 
Previous research on how court-ordered equalization affects public school 
expenditures has not yielded a clear pattern of results. While the literature agrees that 
court-ordered reform improves equality, there is disagreement over the impact of reform 
on education expenditures.  One of the most comprehensive studies to date is that of 
Murray et al. (1998), but their results are quite sensitive to specification.  Once court-
ordered reform is treated as an endogenous variable, two-stage regression analyses show 
that reform achieves its direct aim of leading to a more equal distribution of expenditures 
across school districts, but it does not increase average per-pupil expenditures.  
A consideration of the history of education finance in the United States helps 
determine why court-ordered reform does not bring about dramatic changes.  Contrary to 
what much of the literature suggests, state governments have had a role in education 
finance since the 19th Century, and they assumed a large responsibility for education 
finance during the Great Depression.  Since that time there has been a steady increase in 
the state government share of education revenue, but without sudden changes during the 
period of court-ordered reform.  Regression analysis shows that the state share of 
education revenue typically increases on the order of 10% after court-ordered reform, 
with some states having much larger increases.  In addition, a case study of education 
finance reform in Texas shows a state with political actors who do not wish to reform but 
who are being forced by the courts to consider changes to their system of education 
finance. 
I argue that large changes were never to be expected as state governments have a 
long history of involvement in education finance, and to greatly increase that substantial 
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role would prove quite difficult.  In addition, these cases feature political actors being 
forced to reform a system that was already in equilibrium, and as has been shown in the 
literature, state legislatures are able to find ways of circumventing such limitations.  
Finally, these results also support the idea that court cases often reinforce a current trend 
in public policy rather than serving as a catalyst to begin a new movement. 
 
 
 viii
Table of Contents 
 
Acknowledgements ..........................................................................................................iv 
Abstract .............................................................................................................................vi 
Table of Contents........................................................................................................... viii 
List of Figures ..................................................................................................................ix 
List of Tables .....................................................................................................................x 
Chapter 1: Introduction......................................................................................................1 
Chapter 2: Previous Research on Education Finance Reform .......................................11 
California ...................................................................................................................11 
Other State-Specific Studies......................................................................................14 
Multi-State Studies ....................................................................................................16 
Hoxby Makes the Leveling Down Case ...................................................................20 
Murray et al. Make the Leveling Up Case................................................................22 
Summary....................................................................................................................25 
Chapter 3: The Effects of Court-Ordered Education Finance Reform ..........................29 
Murray et al. Reconsidered .......................................................................................30 
The Endogeneity of Reform......................................................................................55 
A Second Look at the Impact of Court-Ordered Reform.........................................68 
Summary....................................................................................................................73 
Chapter 4: The Pre-Serrano History of Education Finance in the United States ..........75 
Education from Colonial Times to the Early Republic ............................................75 
The High School Movement and Beyond ................................................................81 
Chapter 5: The State Share of Education Revenue.........................................................83 
Education Finance During the 20th Century .............................................................83 
After Serrano .............................................................................................................88 
The Flypaper Effect.................................................................................................104 
Summary..................................................................................................................107 
Chapter 6: Texas and Taxes ..........................................................................................109 
The History of Education Finance Reform in Texas..............................................109 
The Recent Battle over Education Finance in Texas .............................................115 
Interviews with Texas Legislators and Staff Members..........................................122 
Analysis ...................................................................................................................126 
Chapter 7: Conclusion ...................................................................................................130 
Summary..................................................................................................................130 
Future Research .......................................................................................................135 
Bibliography ..................................................................................................................139 
Appendix A: Data Sources ............................................................................................151 
Appendix B: State Constitution Education Clauses .....................................................154 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 ix
List of Figures 
 
Number Page 
3.1 Inequality Measured by Gini Coefficient ...........................................................35 
3.2 Per-Pupil Expenditures........................................................................................40 
5.1 Real Deflated Revenue by Source, 1890–1945..................................................84 
5.2 Real Deflated Revenue by Source, 1945–1970..................................................86 
5.3 Real Deflated Revenue by Source, 1970–2003..................................................87 
5.4 Percent of Revenue by Source, 1970–2003........................................................87 
5.5 State Government Percentage of Education Revenue........................................90 
 
 
 x
List of Tables 
 
Number Page 
1.1 State Supreme Court Rulings Ordering Education Finance Reform...................4 
2.1 Summary of Predicted Impact of Court-Ordered Reform on Inequality...........26 
2.2 Summary of Predicted Impact of Court-Ordered Reform on Per-Pupil  
      Expenditures ........................................................................................................27 
3.1 Percent Change in Gini Coefficient Immediately after Court-Ordered  
      Reform .................................................................................................................38 
3.2 Average Gini Coefficient in States Without Court-Ordered Reform ................39 
3.3 Percent Change in Real Expenditures Immediately after Court-Ordered  
      Reform .................................................................................................................44 
3.4 Results from Murray et al., Effect of Reform on Gini Coefficient....................45 
3.5 Determinants of Inequality in Per-Pupil Expenditures ......................................49 
3.6 Determinants of Per-Pupil Expenditures ............................................................53 
3.7 Gini Coefficient as Potential Instrument for Reform..........................................58 
3.8 Strength of State Constitution Education Clauses as Potential Instrument 
      for Reform ............................................................................................................62 
3.9 Judiciary Variables and Income Inequality as Potential Instruments for  
      Reform..................................................................................................................66 
3.10 Two-Stage Regression on Gini Coefficient......................................................69 
3.11 Two-Stage Regression on Per-Pupil Expenditures ..........................................71 
5.1 Determinants of State Share of Education Revenue ..........................................96 
5.2 Two-Stage Regression on State Share of Education Revenue...........................98 
5.3 Average State Share of Education Revenue for States with and without  
      Court-Ordered Reform ......................................................................................100 
5.4 Two-Stage Regression on State Share of Education Revenue, California 
      and New Hampshire Omitted............................................................................102 
5.5 How Reform Impacts Per-Pupil Expenditures .................................................104 
6.1 Texas Gini Coefficient ......................................................................................114 
B.1 State Constitution Education Clauses ..............................................................154 
 
 
 1
Chapter 1 
Introduction 
Elementary and secondary education in the United States has traditionally been 
seen as primarily the responsibility of local government.  Administered by local school 
districts, the most important source of revenue for public schools has historically been the 
local property tax.  Because of differences in property values, local financing of public 
schools generates large disparities in per-pupil spending across school districts.  In 1971, 
the California Supreme Court ruled in its landmark Serrano v. Priest decision that, 
because of these disparities, the educational finance system then in place in California 
was unconstitutional.   
The example of funding disparities that is cited in the Serrano ruling involves 
school districts within Los Angeles County.  During the 1968-1969 school year, Baldwin 
Park Unified School District spent $577.49 per student, while Beverly Hills Unified 
School District spent $1231.72 per student.  The justices noted that this more than 1 to 2 
ratio in spending reflected the 1 to 13 ratio of per student assessed property values in 
these two school districts.  What was even more disturbing to the justices in the Serrano 
decision was that Baldwin Park had a school property tax rate that was more than twice 
the rate of Beverly Hills, and yet this great tax effort was producing less than half the 
amount of expenditures.  The California Supreme Court thus found the system of 
education finance in California to violate the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment of the United States Constitution, as its structure made the quality of a 
child’s education unfairly dependent upon the wealth of the school district in which that 
child lived (Serrano v. Priest 1971).   
 
 2
After Serrano and other related court rulings, the California legislature was 
compelled to reform the state’s education finance system in order to make per-pupil 
spending much more equitable.  In a 1976 court decision, Serrano II, the legislature was 
told that differences in per-pupil expenditures across school districts were not to exceed 
$100 (this figure has been adjusted for inflation since that time), which meant quite 
stringent equalization would have to be implemented.  Eventually the legislature settled 
on a plan which almost completely centralized spending on public education.  For all but 
the wealthiest districts, the state government supplements local revenue up to the point 
that all school districts spend the same amount per-pupil, resulting in a substantial decline 
in the level of inequality in the California education finance system (Gerber et al. 2000).   
As activists in other states realized the potential of such court cases, these lawsuits 
continued to be filed.  In 1973, the United States Supreme Court issued a ruling in the 
case of San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez.  The Texas education finance system 
also relied heavily upon local property taxes to fund its school districts, and just as in 
California, disparities in property values led to differences in expenditures across Texas 
school districts.  The District Court had ruled that education is a fundamental right under 
the Fourteenth Amendment and that the Texas system was therefore in violation of equal 
protection.  The Supreme Court disagreed, however, and found that the inequalities in the 
Texas education finance system did serve a legitimate state purpose as they allowed for 
control of education at the local level (San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez 1973).   
The important implication of the San Antonio School District case was that 
inequalities in state education finance systems were not a violation of the United States 
Constitution and were therefore not a matter for federal courts.  Those who hoped for 
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change in their states’ education finance system thus had to appeal to state courts for 
relief.  Since Serrano and San Antonio School District, similar law suits have been filed 
in most states, and the courts have, in many cases, ruled to overturn existing systems of 
education finance.  Table 1.1 provides a list of the states which have had their system of 
education finance overturned by the courts, along with the cases and years of those 
rulings.1  This table shows that these cases have happened in every region of the country 
over a period of more than three decades. 
                                                 
1 Information on the sources of the list of court rulings can be found in Appendix A: Data Sources. 
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Table 1.1 — State Supreme Court Rulings  
Ordering Education Finance Reform 
 
State Year of Decision Court Case 
California 1971 Serrano v. Priest 
Kansas 1972 Caldwell v. State 
New Jersey 1973 Robinson v. Cahill 
Connecticut 1977 Horton v. Meskill 
Washington 1978 Seattle School District No. 1  of King County v. State 
West Virginia 1979 Pauley v. Kelly 
Wyoming 1980 Washakie v. Herschler 
Arkansas 1983 Dupree v. Alma School District No. 30 
Kentucky 1989 Rose v. The Council for Better Education, Inc. 
Montana 1989 Helena Elementary School  District No. 1 v. State of Montana 
Texas 1989 Edgewood Independent School District v. Kirby 
Massachusetts 1993 McDuffy v. Secretary of the  Executive Office of Education 
Missouri 1993 Committee for Educational Equality v. State 
New Hampshire 1993 Claremont New Hampshire v. Gregg 
Tennessee 1993 Tennessee Small School Systems v. McWheter 
Arizona 1994 Roosevelt v. Bishop 
North Carolina 1997 Leandro v. State 
Ohio 1997 DeRolph v. State 
Vermont 1997 Brigham v. State 
Alaska 1999 Kasayulie v. State 
New Mexico 1999 Zuni School District v. State 
Maryland 2000 Bradford v. Maryland State Board of Education 
South Carolina 2005 Abbeville County School District v. State 
New York 2006 Campaign for Fiscal Equality v. State 
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 Disparities in education spending have been ruled unacceptable by state courts 
for a variety of reasons.  In some cases, as in Serrano, the court based its decision upon 
an equal protection argument.  That is, they find that the state constitution requires equal 
educational opportunity, and thus the spending disparities in the system must be 
eliminated.  Often such a determination means that education is a fundamental right, and 
so courts can be hesitant to make such a strong declaration.  Other rulings have depended 
upon a standards basis.  In these decisions the court finds that the state constitution 
guarantees students a minimum standard of education that is currently not being met in 
some of the state’s school districts.  In both cases the state legislature is forced to reform 
their education finance system to improve equality either for its own sake or in order to 
ensure that minimum standards are being met in all school districts (McUsic 1991). 
Once the state court has ruled that a finance system is unconstitutional, the state 
legislature must design new funding mechanisms to ameliorate the inequities that the 
court has found objectionable.  In understanding these reforms it is important to realize 
that the changes which a legislature makes to the education finance system may in fact 
improve equality, but they may also have quite perverse effects.  When considering how 
a state might reform its education finance system, it is natural to suppose that the state 
government will in some way provide additional revenue to the poorest school districts in 
order to bring them up to a certain level of spending.  But even with good intentions, this 
is not always the case. 
As will be shown in later chapters, the state governments did provide a large 
percentage of the funding for public education from as early as 1945.  The intent behind 
this support was to enable all school districts to provide some minimal quality of 
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education.  But in their seminal book, Coons et al. (1970) argue that at the time of their 
writing, in the United States a student’s quality of education was still a function of the 
wealth of the school district in which that student lived.  They explain that even though 
state governments are involved in supporting public education, in most cases the 
mechanisms that state governments use to allocate their funds only reinforced the 
disparities in wealth that existed across school districts.   
For example, one standard form of state aid is the flat grant.  Under such a system 
the state government gives the same amount of money per unit (perhaps for every student 
or teacher) to every school district without any consideration for the need of the district.  
These systems have the unfortunate consequence of poor districts being forced to tax 
themselves at a very high rate in order to be able to provide an education for their 
students that is still well below what wealthy districts can provide at much lower tax 
rates.  The authors explain that the other common systems of state aid for education 
reinforce inequalities in similar ways.  Coons et al. then propose that education finance be 
changed to match the idea that, “The quality of public education may not be a function of 
wealth other than the wealth of the state as a whole” (2).  Their work serves as a 
foundation to explain the reasons behind the movement for education finance reform. 
Research on court-ordered education finance reforms typically focuses on the end 
result of the reforms — has finance reform reduced inequality in spending across school 
districts?  How has it changed average education expenditures?  How are the states 
seeking to satisfy the court mandates for more equal spending?     
Chapter 2 provides an in-depth review of the previous work on the impact of 
court-ordered education finance reform.  The literature presents three primary 
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hypotheses.  The first is that states respond to the courts by “leveling up,” that is, 
supplementing local property tax revenue with state funds in order to bring poor school 
districts closer to the expenditure levels of wealthier districts.  Equalization reforms 
would consequently increase total expenditures on education.  Alternatively, court-
ordered reform could be revenue neutral, and simply redistribute education money across 
districts without changing overall expenditures.  That is, by taking funds from the 
wealthy school districts and giving that money to the more disadvantaged school districts, 
the legislatures could improve equality without changing average expenditures.  The third 
possibility is that this type of reform discourages spending on education and that 
equalization is thus achieved by “leveling down.”  Preventing or discouraging wealthier 
districts from spending as much as they want on local schools might weaken support for 
spending on public education, thereby leading to lower total expenditures.   
Chapter 3 begins with an initial investigation of major trends in education finance.  
Regression analysis is then used to estimate the true impact of court-ordered reform on 
equalization and on per-pupil expenditures in order to examine which of these hypotheses 
is supported by the data.  The first step in the regression analysis is to replicate the 
findings of Murray et al. (1998) with two additional panels of data and sensitivity to the 
specification.  With the addition of these panels, the effects of court-ordered reform 
decrease dramatically for both inequality and expenditures.   
An important addition to the research on education finance reform is to model 
court-ordered reform as an endogenous variable rather than as a decision that is 
arbitrarily imposed coming from outside of the education finance system.  One reason 
why court-ordered reform should be considered endogenous is because the court is 
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embedded in the state’s political process, as are the decisions that the legislature then 
makes to implement reform.  Once the endogenous nature of reform is included in the 
analysis, court-ordered reform is still found to decrease inequality, but the impact upon 
education expenditures disappears.  The results of this chapter thus show that court-
ordered reform does reduce inequality within a state’s education finance system, but that 
the level of expenditures increases only slightly, if at all. 
Why is there such a small effect on the level of education expenditures after 
reform?  Chapters 4 and 5 argue that it would have been unrealistic to expect a large 
impact from reform.  Chapter 4 provides a history of education finance in the United 
States and shows that, contrary to what is often presented in the literature, state 
governments have been a source of revenue for public education since at least the 
Common School Movement, and this role continued with the High School Movement 
and into the Great Depression.   
Chapter 5 shows that it was at the time of the Great Depression that state 
governments took upon themselves the responsibility of a major role in financing primary 
and secondary education.  With state governments playing such a vital role in education 
finance well before Serrano, it could hardly be expected that with reform they would be 
able to allocate large amounts of additional funding to the public schools.  What they are 
able to do, however, is reform the education finance systems which are already in place 
in order to make the distribution of funds more equitable.  This chapter looks at how the 
state government share of education revenue has changed since Serrano (in comparison 
to the share of revenue coming from local sources).  The analysis shows that there has 
generally been only a slight increase in the share of revenue from state governments after 
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reform, which goes against the hypothesis that legislatures reform by providing a large 
increase in their support for public education. 
Chapter 6 is a case study of the state of Texas.  Since the Edgewood decision 
mandated change in the system in 1989, the state has continued to work to reform its 
system of education finance.  What is particularly intriguing about this case is the 
apparent inability of the state to reach any agreement over just what those reforms should 
be.   Within the last year the state legislature has battled over demands from the courts to 
once again reform change education finance, and more struggles are expected in the 
future.  Interviews with state legislators and their staff members reveal the turmoil and 
controversy that occur in a state that is being forced to reform by the courts when the 
natural equilibrium is strongly resistant to equalization.  In such a case, where legislators 
have goals that do not align with the court’s decision, it is expected that reform will not 
have the desired impact of equalization and increased education expenditures. 
Chapter 7 concludes with a discussion of the findings and some thoughts about 
useful directions for future research.  The findings fit within a larger view of public 
policy that is rarely considered in the literature on education finance reform.  From the 
beginning there was reason to suspect that these changes would not have the impact that 
many reformers sought.  First, these reforms involve tradeoffs between equality in 
spending and efficiency in spending, an idea presented by Okun (1975).  Okun discusses 
how in the realm of public policy, societies must decide between policies that strongly 
redistribute wealth versus policies that do more to preserve efficiency within a given 
system.  Thus when reformers sought equality in education finance, they likewise should 
have considered that such changes in the level of equality would not necessarily lead to a 
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more efficient system, and therefore additional education expenditures should not have 
been anticipated.  Rae et al. (1981) present another view of equality which should have 
likewise given reformers pause.  These authors discuss the many different possible 
meanings of equality and how they differ from one another.  Therefore, when 
undertaking to improve of the level of equality in education finance, reformers should 
also realize that different players in this process will have varying definitions of equality, 
which in turn means that some stakeholders are sure to be disappointed with the eventual 
outcome.  Thus the goal of equality in and of itself is difficult to achieve and will have 
repercussions for the level of expenditures within the education finance system. 
Second, state policymakers perennially exhibit great creativity in circumventing 
constitutional spending and borrowing restrictions (Kiewiet and Szakaly 1996) and in 
blunting the impact of ballot initiatives (Gerber et al. 2000) or even court rulings 
(Rosenberg 1991).  When legislators are reluctant to make changes which are being 
forced upon them, they are often able to find ways around those limitations.  And as 
Rosenberg’s book demonstrates, court cases in the field of public policy are often simply 
part of a movement which has already begun, and so rather than serving as a catalyst, 
these rulings may simply reinforce a current trend.  Given the evidence, this theory is the 
best fit for the impact of court-ordered reform.  States have long been involved in 
education finance, and what these court cases have done is serve as an incentive for state 
legislators to continue to increase their support for education and to continue to make 
educational opportunity more equitable, but they have not led to the dramatic changes for 
which many reformers had hoped.  This story begins in the next chapter, which provides 
an in-depth literature review of studies on the impact of education finance reform. 
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Chapter 2 
Previous Research on Education Finance Reform 
There has been considerable theoretical and empirical work that examines how 
court-ordered school finance reform might impact education expenditures.  These efforts 
have yielded a great deal of insight into the major factors affecting educational 
expenditures, but they have also yielded very different predictions as to the consequence 
of court-ordered equalization, both on the distribution of expenditures and on the overall 
level of per-pupil expenditures.  This chapter provides a review of the major work on the 
effects of education finance reform. 
 
California 
 Much previous empirical work on the question of how school finance reform 
impacts expenditures has focused on a particular state — California.  This state is often 
the object of analysis because court-ordered school finance reform began with the 
Serrano decision of 1971, and subsequent political developments have made it a 
particularly interesting case.  Silva and Sonstelie (1995) note that California’s spending 
per pupil fell, relative to other states, between the years 1970 and 1990, and they seek to 
determine whether the Serrano decision was responsible for this decrease.  They begin 
with a local public finance model in which families sort into local school districts 
according to their preference for education spending, just as in Tiebout (1956).  Silva and 
Sonstelie next combine all of these school districts into one statewide district.  Now the 
level of spending for the whole state is determined by the voter with the median income, 
which is less than the average income.  Thus in their model of school finance, when there 
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is a move from local to state financing (and thus presumably toward equalization), there 
is a price effect that essentially lowers the tax price for the median voter in the state.  This 
effect therefore tends to increase government expenditures as the median voter is willing 
to spend more for education.  A corresponding income effect arises due to centralization, 
however, in that the income of the median voter in the state is less than the average 
income level, which means the level of spending for the state decreases.  This income 
effect then leads to lower expenditures.  Because the price and income effects work in 
opposite directions, the net effect of reform must be determined empirically.  Silva and 
Sonstelie use data from all other states to estimate a model of school expenditures and 
find that California’s per pupil spending in 1969–70 is within one standard error of the 
predicted value, but that per pupil spending in 1989–1990 is well below the predicted 
value.  They conclude that Serrano, along with disproportionately large enrollment 
growth, led to a decrease, relative to other states, in per-pupil spending in California.   
 Gerber et al. (2000) include a case study of the California Serrano decision, 
considered along with the enactment of the celebrated tax and spending limitation 
initiatives, Proposition 13 and Proposition 4.  Proposition 13, approved by the voters in 
1978, significantly rolled back property taxes and limited their future growth.  
Proposition 4, passed in 1979, was intended to constrain real per capita increases in state 
spending by imposing a cap set by the combination of population growth and inflation.  
They conclude that Propositions 4 and 13 did impact education spending by limiting state 
spending in general, but that this effect only lasted until the mid-1980s.  They also report 
that, “…all indicators are that the Serrano decisions actually led to a larger share of total 
spending being allocated to elementary and secondary education” (107).  They believe 
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that the decline in spending on education is due to California’s declining wealth relative 
to other states, and that California has always spent a relatively smaller part of its budget 
on public education than other states.  Thus there is conflicting empirical evidence on the 
effect of the Serrano decision on per-pupil expenditures in California. 
 Fernández and Rogerson (1999) also model the effects of reform on the 
distribution and level of funding in California.  They note that before Serrano, California 
did not have a system of pure local funding.  Rather, as in most states, the state supported 
a “foundation” system in which districts were guaranteed a certain level of state funding, 
provided that they levied a minimum property tax rate.  Districts were then free to use 
additional taxes to spend above foundation levels.  The state of California, like almost all 
other states, was thus making some effort to equalize expenditures even before Serrano. 
As they note, however, California nonetheless had a very high level of inequality across 
school districts.  Using a political economy model, Fernández and Rogerson estimate that 
the move from the foundation system to the centralized funding system post-Serrano 
reduced total spending on public primary education by about 10%.  They conclude that, 
“…while the reform greatly increased equity in educational expenditures across students, 
it did so largely by decreasing spending in wealthy districts, with increases only for 
students in extremely poor districts” (348).  Thus in this model the authors assume that 
equalization does occur and then find that it results in leveling down. 
 Earlier work by Fernández and Rogerson (1998) develops a dynamic equilibrium 
model to determine the impact of school finance reforms on income distribution and 
overall welfare.  Their overlapping generations model looks specifically at the changes 
that would occur in a move from a purely local school finance system to a purely 
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centralized school finance system.  Once their model is calibrated so that the variables 
which characterize their model match those of the United States, Fernández and 
Rogerson find that state financing would result in a higher level of education 
expenditures than local financing, as well as a higher average income.  The authors also 
note that a foundation system, which is a combination of the two pure systems, would 
lead to higher education expenditures than either a local or state system. Because they say 
that California moved from a foundation system to a state system, this matches with the 
findings in their other work that the Serrano reform in California led to a decrease in 
expenditures.  Thus the work by Fernández and Rogerson says that in California court-
ordered reform led to equalization with a resulting decrease in expenditures. 
 
Other State-Specific Studies 
Scholars have also studied the impact of reform in other states.  For example, 
Goetz and Debertin (1992) consider the early impact of court-ordered reform on the 
Kentucky education finance system.  The Kentucky General Assembly was quick to 
respond to the 1989 Rose v. Council for Better Education, Inc., decision which found the 
state’s education finance system unconstitutional.  Kentucky’s Educational Reform Act 
(KERA) increased taxes and appropriated additional funds for education in order to 
ensure a minimum level of funding for each school district, and also adjusted state 
funding based upon a district’s ability to raise local revenue.  The authors find that KERA 
increased education revenue for all school districts in the state, and particularly for those 
districts with special-needs students.  They additionally find that while per-pupil 
spending and income are positively correlated, this correlation did decrease after KERA.  
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An interesting finding of Goetz and Debertin is that while spending inequality (as 
measured by the standard deviation of spending across school districts) decreased for the 
state as a whole, there was not as much improvement in the measure of inequality when 
the state is broken down by regions.  Thus in Kentucky the initial impact of court-ordered 
reform was an increase in spending and a decrease in inequality, although complete 
equalization was certainly not attained. 
 Thompson et al. (1993) conduct a similar study of Kansas education finance 
reform.  With the School District Equalization Act of 1973 (SDEA), the Kansas 
Legislature responded to the 1972 court case Caldwell v. State which found education to 
be a fundamental right in the state, and again the goal of the act was to provide additional 
state aid to the most disadvantaged school districts.  In order to determine the impact of 
this legislation, the authors use Pearson correlation coefficients to measure the 
relationship between measures of district wealth (such as taxable income) and per-pupil 
spending.  Because these correlations decreased from the 1983–84 time period to the 
1988–89 period, the legislation at first seems to be reducing inequality in education 
expenditures in the state.  The problem is that one large category of school districts, those 
with enrollment of between 1800 and 10,000 students, moved in the opposite direction, 
with increases in the correlation between wealth measure and per-pupil spending.  
Thompson et al. conclude that while some improvements have been made, the move 
toward equality has not gone far enough in Kansas, with some districts even moving in 
the direction of increasing inequality. 
 Meyers et al. (1995) consider some very preliminary results from the 1993 court-
order for reform in Tennessee, Tennessee Small School Systems v. McWheter, but they 
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believe the data are promising.  The Tennessee legislature responded with a reform called 
the Basic Education Program (BEP).  The goal of equalization is accounted for in this 
program with a formula that considers each school district’s fiscal capacity in order to set 
the level of state funding.  For the one year of data available to the authors after the 
passage of BEP, they find that the poorest school districts received $269 per pupil from 
this program, whereas the most advantaged school districts received just $128 per pupil.  
Because the money available from BEP was expected to greatly increase in future years, 
the authors find these figures promising as they indicate that the state was in fact working 
toward equalization of education spending with particular regard for disadvantaged 
schools districts. 
 
Multi-State Studies 
The studies discussed above constitute only a small sample of the work that has 
been done to understand the impact of reform in individual states.  Other researchers have 
examined equalization reform more generally across the United States.  Dayton (1996) 
reviews the work of scholars who have considered whether court-ordered reforms reduce 
inequality in education finance.  While Dayton does not look directly at work on how 
court-ordered reform affects education expenditures, he does consider the efficacy of the 
courts in making any change in education finance.  Dayton is careful to note the factors 
which affect a state court’s ability to induce any real change.  For instance, compared to 
federal judges, state judges are more sensitive to their state’s political climate as they are 
often subject to either election or review.  Additionally, the economic health of a state is 
likely to affect a legislature’s ability to respond to a court mandate.  Dayton notes that the 
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courts may not be the great catalyst for change that many reformers have hoped, because 
ultimately the funding systems must be changed by the state legislatures, which are far 
from being under the control of the judiciary.  Alternatively, if these court cases were 
completely ineffective in promoting change, it is unlikely that so many plaintiffs in so 
many states would continue to spend time and energy pursuing this litigation.  Thus 
Dayton believes that the joint action of all of these factors makes it difficult to reach a 
clear conclusion about how litigation will impact the level of inequality or expenditures 
in the education finance systems. 
Manwaring and Sheffrin (1997), using panel data of states from 1970 to 1990, 
disaggregate the potential effects of education finance reform on education expenditures 
into four classes.  The first is a state effect which is a measure of how much of the 
responsibility of education funding transfers from the local district to the state level after 
reform.  The next is the income effect, which is per capita income, in order to control for 
the same income effect discussed by Silva and Sonstelie (1995).  The third class is the 
budget status effect which is a measure of whether there is a surplus of state government 
revenues, which would be likely to increase spending on education.  The final class is the 
base effect which is a dummy variable to capture any other effects of reform. 
Manwaring and Sheffrin then estimate the impact of reform on each of these 
categories.  They find that in states like California, where reform converted a foundation 
system into a centralized state system, overall expenditures decreased.  Interestingly, their 
analysis also suggests that education spending in states with court-ordered reform is more 
closely tied to the condition of the state budget (that is, whether the state budget has a 
surplus or is facing more economic pressure).  In their view, it is also possible that reform 
 
 18
will lead to an increase in spending.  Education finance systems that are not centralized 
but instead rely upon a power-equalization or foundation system will spend relatively 
more on education.  As an example, in an in-depth look at the process of equalization 
reform in Wisconsin, Manwaring and Sheffrin demonstrate how in that case reform 
would have had the effect of increasing per student expenditures.  The authors conclude 
that equalization through centralization will tend to lead to lower education expenditures.  
But because of the options that states have in implementing reform, it will not always be 
the case that there will be a decrease in education spending.  Ultimately they estimate that 
in the long run, the average court-ordered reform results in an increase in per-pupil 
expenditures of $106 in 1990 dollars. 
Wood and Theobald (2003) analyze state funding to unified school districts with 
at least 500 students from 1992 to 1996.  In their regression analysis they find that low 
local revenue, low per capita income, and low property values are the primary reasons 
that state governments provide additional money to school districts — presumably to 
equalize spending. Secondary considerations for the allocation of state funds are 
providing education revenue for the areas that are most likely to benefit from the 
additional money (for example, money for education might help to lower an 
exceptionally high unemployment rate), as well as what the authors call “distributive 
politics,” meaning simple political concerns of legislators (such as pleasing their 
constituents).  They also find that more-liberal states are more likely to equalize 
education expenditures than conservative states, and that court rulings for equalization 
tend to have a larger effect in more-liberal states. These effects include both reductions in 
inequality and a larger increase in school funding.  Ultimately Wood and Theobald 
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believe that the inequalities in education finance are not likely to disappear after reform 
due to the many political considerations which factor into the state’s allocation to school 
districts and because court rulings do not appear to always be effective.   
 Downes and Shah (2006) model education expenditures through a reduced-form 
equation which combines the demand for education with the costs of providing public 
education.  Using state-level data, they interact each of their explanatory variables with a 
dummy variable for legislative education finance reform, as a well as a dummy variable 
for court-ordered reform.  Their aim is to show not just how reform impacts per-pupil 
expenditures, but the way in which reform affects the structure of the education finance 
system.  For example, after court-ordered reform, they find that the relationship between 
per capita income and education expenditures decreases because these reforms tend to 
limit the discretion of school districts in setting their own education spending.  Downes 
and Shah also find that legislative reforms can have different effects than court-ordered 
reforms, and that court-ordered reforms tend to be more restrictive.  They conclude that 
the true effects of reform on expenditures should be determined on an individual basis, 
and that the changes in the process by which education expenditures are set should also 
be taken into account to understand the full impact of reform.  Some authors have 
suggested that reform will cause increases in education expenditures because of the 
attention that a lawsuit brings to deficiencies in the education finance system.  However, 
Downes and Shah note that their results provide more support for the case that reform can 
erode support for public education in wealthy school districts that are restricted in their 
spending. 
 One shortcoming of the Downes and Shah study is that they use panel data for all 
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50 states from only 1970 to 1990, and so they omit analysis of the many important 
reforms that took place during the 1990s.  They do note that the reforms after 1990 were 
primarily motivated to attain “adequacy,” and so may have had a different impact than 
the earlier reforms which were based upon equality arguments.  Still, there were so many 
cases of court-ordered education finance reform during the 1990s that they should be 
taken into consideration.  Additionally, by limiting their data set, Downes and Shah are 
not considering the long-term impact of education finance reform which can now be 
studied in states that experienced the earliest reforms, such as California.  It is also true 
that the early cases which focused on equality arguments may have had a slightly 
different impact than the more recent cases which focused on issues of educational 
adequacy.  However, in both types of cases reformers ultimately hoped for additional 
money for public education, particularly for the poorest school districts, thereby making 
it necessary to understand the impact of both types of rulings.   
 
Hoxby Makes the Leveling Down Case 
 Hoxby (2001) characterizes school finance equalizations through “(1) the 
foundation tax rate, (2) the school finance-related income or sales tax rate, (3) the 
flat/foundation grant, and (4) the tax price,” (1205) in order to explain the observed 
effects of these changes to school finance systems throughout the United States (the 
author considers all equalizations, not just those implemented after court-ordered reform).  
Hoxby is particularly careful to account for the endogenous nature of school finance 
equalization.  In her model changes to the system are capitalized into housing prices.   
School revenues are in turn dependent upon property values, which determine education 
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expenditures.  As Hoxby explains, “... a number of [school finance equalization] schemes 
have built-in feedback loops that exaggerate the initial tendency toward leveling down” 
(1205).  
 Hoxby then estimates the effect of school finance equalizations on per-pupil 
spending using school district-level data.  Because of the argument that those variables 
which characterize school finance equalizations are in fact affected by that equalization 
plan, Hoxby uses a method of instrumental variables to account for this endogeneity 
problem.  In this approach the instrument is the predicted value of the school district’s 
characteristics, had equalization not occurred.  The author’s regressions show that the 
effect of equalization on per-pupil expenditures is dependent upon the equalization 
scheme which is implemented. Those states that imposed the strictest equalization 
schemes tended to level-down in their per-pupil expenditures, in that after reform they 
spent less per-pupil than they had before reform.  Those states that did not impose such 
stringent schemes were those that were able to level-up, or spend more per-pupil after 
reform.  Hoxby additionally finds that those states with extreme equalization have also 
tended to lower their property values through the use of these schemes. 
 Hoxby and Kuziemko (2004) use these ideas to consider how equalization has 
affected property values in Texas.  Their main argument is that the system of education 
finance in Texas does not account for the fact that school districts will respond to the 
scheme that is imposed upon them.  The authors explain that property values in a 
property-rich school district will fall as consumers respond to what is essentially a greater 
tax burden, and this result will in turn decrease the amount of revenue for schools that 
can be raised through property taxes.  Hoxby and Kuziemko use an approach that is 
 
 22
similar to that of Hoxby (2001) in order to estimate the effect of the Texas equalization 
plan on the levels of per-pupil spending in each school district.  The predicted variables 
that characterize the finance situation in each school district are used as instruments to 
control for the endogenous response to the state’s equalization plan.  Their regression 
results show that while the property-poorest and intermediate school districts faced little 
to no capitalization due to equalization, the wealthiest districts show large negative 
capitalization.  Hoxby and Kuziemko thus claim that equalization in Texas cost the state 
approximately $27,000 per student in property values.  They also find that equalization 
did occur; that is, the plan did decrease the amount of inequality in per-pupil spending 
across school districts in Texas. 
 Thus Hoxby has argued that under certain specifications, equalization plans will 
result in a leveling-down of per-pupil expenditures, and that this has in fact been the 
consequence of reform in several states.  One reason for this leveling-down is that states 
are actually destroying property values because of the capitalization of the new tax 
schemes which school districts face.  Alternatively, other equalization plans can and do 
lead to leveling-up, and these schemes are typically found in those states which do not 
implement the most extreme equalizations.   
 
Murray et al. Make the Leveling Up Case  
Evans et. al (1999), a group whose work is some of the most comprehensive in 
the field of education finance reform, take issue with Hoxby’s findings.  In their work 
Evans et al. find that reform typically raises education expenditures, and so their results 
raise concerns about Hoxby’s findings of negative capitalization in several states.  But 
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Evans et al. also raise concerns about Hoxby’s framework.  They find that after court-
ordered reform, state governments increase their funding support for local school 
districts, and these grants increase education spending more than economic theory 
predicts (a result known in the public finance literature as the flypaper effect), a result 
which is not accounted for in Hoxby’s analysis.  Evans et al. also disagree with the 
decision to treat a school district’s tax base as endogenous, since school districts 
themselves are likely to take their tax base as given in deciding on a taxing scheme rather 
than attempting to select a tax plan that will in some way alter their property values. 
 Support for these arguments can be found in their work on education finance 
reform, which includes their most comprehensive work in Murray et al. (1998), 
supplemented by a previous study (Evans et al. 1997), and two follow-up studies (Evans 
et al. 1999 and Corcoran et al. 2003).  The main concerns of this team of researchers have 
been to consider the effect of education reform on the level of inequality in spending and 
on the level of total education expenditures.  Murray et al. weight expenditures by student 
enrollment in each school district and calculate four measures of inequality across school 
districts for each state in their sample: the Gini coefficient, the Theil index, the natural 
logarithm of the ratio of spending at the 95th percentile to the 5th percentile, and the 
coefficient of variation, which all have different sensitivities to changes in the 
distribution of expenditures.   
 They then create an indicator variable, Reform, that takes the value of 1 for each 
year after court-ordered reform occurs within a state, and is 0 otherwise.  Using a state 
and year fixed-effects model to estimate its impact on the different measures of 
inequality, they find that the coefficient of Reform is negative and significant, implying 
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that reform reduces inequality.  Their results change very little with the addition of other 
covariates.  They then estimate a similar model in which the dependent variable is a 
measure of total state and local per-pupil revenues.  Here they find that the coefficient of 
the Reform dummy is positive and significant, indicating that court-ordered reform 
increases per-pupil revenues, and, presumably, per-pupil expenditures.  Their estimate is 
that court-ordered reform increases education revenue by $442 per-pupil (in 1992 
dollars).  By decomposing school district expenditures into the 95th, 50th, and 5th 
percentiles, they also find that Reform increases spending in the 50th and 5th percentiles, 
while leaving spending in the 95th percentile unchanged, which leads to the authors’ 
claim that states increase expenditures by helping the poorest school districts and not 
altering spending in the wealthiest districts.  Murray et al. then consider whether Reform 
has an impact on areas of state spending other than education, such as welfare or 
corrections, and they find that no other areas of state spending are affected by this 
increase in education expenditures. 
 In subsequent work, (Evans et. al 1999), the authors investigate further how court-
ordered reform changed the distribution of education expenditures.  They divide school 
districts in each state into quartiles according to their per-pupil revenues and again use 
regression analysis to determine the coefficient of Reform for each quartile.  Evans et al. 
additionally split the school district revenues into local and state funding so as to 
determine how Reform impacts each of these sources.  The authors find no evidence that 
in the poorest quartile of school districts the total increase in revenues due to Reform is 
significantly different from the overall average increase in revenues after Reform.  They 
do, however, find that in the poorest quartile revenues from the state government do 
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significantly increase after Reform, with some indication that revenue from the local 
governments slightly decreases in turn.  This evidence thus supports their argument that 
court-ordered reform causes state governments to play a larger role in education finance, 
primarily by providing additional revenue for the poorest school districts. 
 Continuing this work, Corcoran et al. (2003), consider similar questions, now 
adding the 1997 data panel to their analysis.  They again find that Reform significantly 
decreases inequality in education expenditures.  Using a specification that is the same as 
that used in their previous work, Corcoran et al. find that with education revenue, the 
regression coefficient for court-ordered reform is positive and significant, and that most 
of this increase is the result of additional money from state sources and not from local 
sources of revenue.  In 1992 dollars, they estimate that court-ordered reform increases 
education revenues by approximately $726 per student.  In short, the body of work by 
Murray et al. indicates that court-ordered reform decreases inequality and increases per-
pupil expenditures as state governments spend more on education. 
 
Summary 
 There is considerable controversy as to the impact of court-ordered education 
finance reform.  Table 2.1 provides a synopsis of the impact that the authors reviewed 
here predict court-ordered reform will have on inequality across school districts within a 
state.  This table shows the general agreement that reform will in fact decrease inequality, 
although there is a great deal of debate over the extent of the improvement which will 
result.  Table 2.2 provides a summary of the predicted impact of court-ordered reform on 
education expenditures.  There is clearly much less agreement in this area, as some 
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authors assert that reform increases expenditures, others contend that reform decreases 
education spending, and still others believe that the effect is indeterminate.  
 
Table 2.1 — Summary of Predicted Impact of  
Court-Ordered Reform on Inequality 
Authors 
Predicted Impact of 
Court-Ordered 
Reform  
on Inequality 
Notes 
Dayton (1996) Indeterminate 
The complexity of factors makes a 
clear conclusion difficult, but many 
scholars are pessimistic about large 
changes. 
Downes and Shah (2006) Decrease 
Court-ordered reforms will be more 
restrictive than just legislative 
reforms. 
Fernández and Rogerson 
(1999) Decrease 
Happened primarily by decreasing 
spending in wealthy districts. 
Gerber et al. (2000) Decrease 
Assumes almost perfect 
equalization occurred in California 
due to strict court ruling. 
Hoxby (2001) Decrease 
The degree of equalization depends 
upon the reforms that are 
implemented. 
Hoxby and Kuziemko 
(2004) Decrease 
Considers only Texas; inequality 
did decrease, but full equality was 
not achieved. 
Murray et al. (1998),  
and later work Decrease 
Consistent results for a decrease in 
inequality after reform. 
Silva and Sonstelie 
(1995) Decrease 
Assumes perfect equalization 
occurred in California due to strict 
court ruling. 
Wood and Theobald 
(2003) Decrease 
Inequalities will remain because of 
the politics behind education 
finance. 
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Table 2.2 — Summary of Predicted Impact of  
Court-Ordered Reform on Per-Pupil Expenditures 
Authors 
Predicted Impact of 
Court-Ordered 
Reform on Per-Pupil 
Expenditures 
Notes 
Dayton (1996) Indeterminate 
The complexity of factors makes a 
clear conclusion difficult, but many 
scholars are pessimistic about large 
changes. 
Downes and Shah (2006) Indeterminate 
Effect should be determined on an 
individual basis by looking at the 
changes in the structure of the 
school finance system. 
Fernández and Rogerson 
(1999) Decrease 
Assumes a move from a mixed 
foundation system to a purely 
centralized system. 
Fernández and Rogerson 
(1998) Decrease 
Calibrated to United States data and 
assumes a move from a foundation 
system to a purely centralized 
system, as in California; moving 
from purely local to a state system 
would alternatively increase 
expenditures. 
Gerber et al. (2000) Indeterminate 
California is a special case and  
has always spent a relatively 
smaller part of its budget on public 
education than other states. 
Hoxby (2001) Indeterminate 
States with extreme equalization 
plans level-down; moderate 
schemes allow for leveling-up. 
Hoxby and Kuziemko 
(2004) Decrease Discusses Texas equalization only. 
Manwaring and Sheffrin 
(1997) Indeterminate 
Centralization leads to lower 
education expenditures but other 
options are possible. 
Murray et al. (1998),  
and later work Increase 
There is particularly an increase in 
state revenues to the poorest school 
districts. 
Silva and Sonstelie 
(1995) Indeterminate 
Net impact of price and income 
effects must be determined 
empirically. 
Wood and Theobald 
(2003) Increase 
The size of the increase is 
dependent upon the state’s political 
climate. 
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 The differences in these arguments are particularly highlighted by the work of 
Hoxby and Murray et al.  Some authors, led by the work of Murray et al., assert that 
court-ordered reform will bring attention to the cause of education finance, and that the 
state legislatures will allocate additional funding for education, which will in turn lead to 
an overall increase in education expenditures.  The particular claim of Murray et al. is 
that legislatures will provide additional support for education, and that this increase in 
funding will have no impact on the other areas of state government spending.  The 
alternative argument offered by Hoxby and others is that court-ordered education finance 
reform leads to greater centralization of the education system.  Because in a centralized 
system increases in local taxes will not be appreciated in the local school district, the 
incentives of such a system will discourage education spending and thus lead to a 
decrease in expenditures.  Hoxby also makes the case that these centralizations can even 
destroy property values, which will further decrease the revenues available for public 
education. 
Which argument is correct?  What are the mechanisms by which court-ordered 
reform operates?  In order to determine the impact of court-ordered reform on education 
inequality and education, careful analysis must be employed, and this is the topic of the 
next chapter. 
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Chapter 3 
The Effects of Court-Ordered Education Finance Reform 
As shown in the previous chapter, scholars who study education finance reform 
have reached divergent conclusions as to its consequences.  While most agree that court-
ordered reform decreases inequality within a state’s education finance system, there is 
sharp disagreement over the impact of reform on overall expenditures.  Some authors 
assert that states generally “level up,” others believe that they “level down,” and others 
believe that the effects are not readily determined.     
In this chapter, analysis of the effects of court-ordered finance reform begins by 
seeking to replicate the findings of the comprehensive and highly influential work by 
Murray et al. (1998).  Some desirable econometric improvements are made, and the data 
is augmented with two additional panels of data (1997 and 2002) that have become 
available since their study.  Their basic model is then modified by treating court-ordered 
school finance reform as a matter of choice, and thus as an endogenous variable.  There 
are a number of reasons to do so.  Whether or not to bring such litigation forward is a 
choice that potential plaintiffs have to make.  Whether or not to hear such a case and how 
to decide it are choices that state courts must make.  Responding to a court decision 
holding that an existing system of educational finance is unconstitutional presents a 
whole battery of choices that state legislators and state governors must to consider.  All 
these choices are likely influenced by factors that are not fully accounted for in the 
regression analyses that Murray and others have performed (Angrist and Krueger 2001). 
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Murray et al. Reconsidered    
 I start the examination of the Murray et al. study by reviewing their coding of 
cases of court-ordered reform.  The main concern of this team of researchers was to 
consider the effect of education reform on the level of inequality in spending and on the 
level of total expenditures.  Their primary source of data is the School System Finance 
(F-33) File from the Census of Governments, U. S. Bureau of the Census, which reports 
data on school districts at five-year intervals, beginning in school year 1972.  They 
confine their analysis to unified school districts, and drop Alaska, Hawaii, Montana, and 
Vermont from the sample because of the unusual structure of their school district 
systems. 
Murray et al. then weight expenditures by student enrollment in each district and 
calculate four measures of inequality across school districts for each state in their sample: 
the Gini coefficient, the Theil index, the natural logarithm of the ratio of spending at the 
95th percentile to the 5th percentile, and the coefficient of variation.  As the authors 
explain, the Gini coefficient is relatively sensitive to changes around the middle of the 
distribution.  The Theil index is more sensitive to relative changes among very unequal 
school districts, and the natural logarithm of the ratio of spending at the 95th percentile to 
the 5th percentile is not sensitive to more extreme values.  The coefficient of variation is 
more responsive to extreme values as it changes by the same amount for all transfers 
between districts regardless of the level of expenditures of those districts. 
 Murray et al. create an indicator variable, Reform, that takes on the value of 1 for 
each year after court-ordered reform occurs within a state, and 0 otherwise.  Using a state 
and year fixed-effects model to estimate its impact, they find that the coefficient of 
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Reform is negative and significant, implying that reform reduces inequality.  Their results 
change very little with the addition of other covariates and do not depend upon the 
particular measure of inequality that they use.  They then estimate a similar model in 
which the dependent variable is a measure of total state and local per-pupil revenues.  
Here they find that the coefficient of the Reform dummy is positive and significant, 
indicating that court-ordered reform increases per-pupil revenues, and, presumably, per-
pupil expenditures.  Thus Murray et al. conclude that court-ordered education finance 
reform leads to leveling-up. 
Their coding scheme needed to be updated in order to bring to bear the 1997 and 
2002 panels of data that have become available since their study.  The sources that were 
used to decide whether each state has had court-ordered reform, as well as when the 
reform occurred, can be found in Appendix A: Data Sources.  As previously shown in 
Table 1.1, of the 46 states in the sample, 19 had experienced court-ordered educational 
reform by 2002. 
 My assessment of whether or not such reform had occurred in some cases differed 
slightly from Murray et al., who had noted that some cases were not clean-cut.2  Note that 
all of these decisions about court-ordered reform are as of 2002, and do not reflect 
subsequent developments.  My updates and disagreements over coding are as follows: 
 
1.  Murray et al. list Alabama as a state with a pending lawsuit.  In 1993 a trial court in 
                                                 
2 Murray et al. do note some problems with the Kansas and Wisconsin court cases and drop them as reform 
states in a check of the robustness of their analysis.  They find that this change in does not alter their 
results. 
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Alabama ruled that extensive inequities in the state’s education finance system violated 
the state constitution on both equality and adequacy grounds.  The legislature was given 
time to institute a remedy, but the Alabama Supreme Court vacated the remedy order in 
1997, and then, in an unusual occurrence, dismissed the case in 2002.  Alabama is thus 
still coded as having no court reform as its system was upheld by the courts.   
 
2.  Murray et al. list Idaho as a state in which the education finance system had been 
previously upheld.  By 2002, a new case was pending in Idaho in a trial court that had 
appointed a special master to assess the schools and to report back to the court.  As no 
decision in the case had been rendered by 2002, Idaho is still coded as having no court 
reform.   
 
3.  Murray et al. code Kansas as having court-ordered reform after a 1976 case, but the 
state legislature actually responded to a 1972 decision by creating a new foundation-
based system of education finance.  Kansas is therefore considered to have had court-
ordered reform in 1972 and not 1976.  Because of the panel nature of the data and the 
method for constructing Reform, as explained below, this does not actually change how 
Kansas is coded for the 1972 or 1977 panels. 
  
4.  Murray et al. list Missouri with pending court cases.  A trial court overturned the 
state’s funding system in 1993, and the state legislature responded by increasing school 
funding.  This was a trial court decision, but because there was action by the state 
legislature, Missouri is coded as having reform after 1993, which is a change from the 
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Murray et al. coding.   
 
5.  Murray et al. list New York as a state in which the education finance system has been 
upheld by the courts several times.  The case of Campaign for Fiscal Equity (CFE) v. 
State has actually been working through the New York court system for several years, 
but, as of 2002, there had not been a conclusive decision.   New York is therefore still 
coded as having no reform.   
 
6.  South Carolina is listed by Murray et al. as a state in which the education finance 
system had been upheld by the courts.  In 2002, a case was still pending in trial court, so 
the state is still coded as having no court reform.   
 
7.  Murray et al. code Wisconsin as a state having reform following a court case in 1976.  
In this case, however, the court actually overturned a new system of funding equalization 
that the state legislature had just implemented.  The ruling thus actually worked against 
equalization. Since that time the courts have not again overturned the system of funding 
in Wisconsin, so the coding for Wisconsin is changed to a state with no court reform.   
 
I constructed the Reform variable for my analysis with a one-year lag under the 
assumption that it would take at least one year for a state legislature to implement any 
reform.  For example, I stated above that Kansas had court-ordered reform in 1972.  
Since I am concerned with fiscal years because of the nature of school year budgets, and 
because of the one-year lag, Reform would be “1” for Kansas for fiscal year 1974 (school 
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year 1973-1974) and each year thereafter.  Due to the panel nature of the data set, the first 
panel in which Kansas would be “1” would then be 1977.   
The next step in the analysis is to simply graph the measure of inequality in each 
state for each panel over fiscal (or academic) years 1972 to 2002.  These graphs are 
shown in Figure 3.1 below, with solid lines representing the inequality measure for the 
individual state and the dotted lines representing the average inequality taken as an 
average of the 46 states at each point in time for the United States as a whole.  The first 
group includes all 19 of the states that experienced court-ordered education finance 
reform during the 1972–2002 time period.  The year of reform is indicated by the dark 
vertical line.  The second group includes a sample of those states that have experienced 
reform lawsuits but in which the court decided to uphold the current system of finance.  
The years of the decisions are again indicated by vertical lines.  The third group 
represents those states that have not experienced significant education reform litigation.   
Based upon the data plotted in Figure 3.1, court-ordered finance reform does 
appear to drive down the level of cross-district inequality in expenditures.  Only the Gini 
coefficient is shown in these graphs, but the other measures of inequality are highly 
correlated with the Gini coefficient, and so the graphs are essentially the same.3  For 
those states that did have court-ordered reform, it appears that the level of inequality 
tended to decrease shortly after the ruling.   
                                                 
3 The correlation between the Gini coefficient and Theil index is 0.96, between the Gini coefficient and 
ln(95th/5th) is 0.92, and between the Theil index and ln(95th/5th) is 0.91. 
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Figure 3.1 — Inequality Measured by Gini Coefficient: 
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States with Funding System Upheld by Court 
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Table 3.1 reports how many of the 19 states included in the data set which had 
court-ordered reform between 1972 and 2002 fall into each range of percent change in the 
Gini coefficient immediately after court-ordered reform.  
Table 3.1 – Percent Change in Gini Coefficient  
Immediately after Court-Ordered Reform 
 
Range of Percent Change in Gini 
Immediately after  
Court-Ordered Reform 
Number 
of States 
Decrease greater than 40 % 1 
Decrease between 20 and 30 % 4 
Decrease between 10 and 20 % 4 
Decrease between 0 and 10% 6 
Increase between 0 and 15 % 3 
Increase greater than 30 % 1 
 
15 of the states had a decrease in the Gini coefficient, and of the four states that had an 
increase, three of these were relatively small (New Mexico is the exception with an 
increase in the Gini coefficient of almost 37%).  Of those states with decreases, 
California has the largest with a decrease of over 43%, indicating that the legislature 
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implemented quite stringent reforms.4  It also appears that those states which had earlier 
court-ordered reform had larger immediate drops in inequality.  There are no similar 
changes occurring in those states where the system of school finance was upheld by the 
courts, or in those states that have had no cases of school finance litigation.  Instead, after 
a few years of increasing inequality in the 1970s and early 1980s, more recently these 
states have seen a decline in inequality, as shown in Table 3.2. 
Table 3.2 – Average Gini Coefficient in States  
Without Court-Ordered Reform 
 
Year 
Average 
Gini 
Coefficient 
1972 .0786 
1977 .0815 
1982 .0827 
1987 .0787 
1992 .0779 
1997 .0615 
2002 .0644 
 
  I next charted the real per-pupil (on an average daily attendance, or ADA, basis) 
expenditures for each state over fiscal years 1972 to 2002, where again the solid lines 
represent expenditures for the state and the dotted lines represent per-pupil expenditures 
for the entire United States.  Expenditures are reported in 1992 dollars.  The primary 
                                                 
4 The stringency of these reforms is due in large part to Serrano II, the 1976 ruling which followed 
Serrano, which demanded that spending disparities across school districts in California not exceed $100 
per-pupil (this number can be adjusted for inflation over time) (Gerber et al. 2000).  Such a strict limitation 
from the court forced the legislature to implement an education finance system which was highly equitable. 
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feature that is apparent in all of the graphs displayed in Figure 3.2 (which includes the 
same states as Figure 3.1) is the long-term secular increase in real per-pupil expenditures 
in all states, regardless of what the state courts have or have not done.  In contrast to the 
inequality data displayed in Figure 3.1, there do not appear to be any systematic changes 
in overall funding levels after reform is ordered or after the constitutionality of an 
existing funding system is upheld.  The graphs of states that have experienced no 
education finance litigation look essentially like the other states that are shown.   
Figure 3.2 – Per-Pupil Expenditures (1992 Dollars):  
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States with No Reform Litigation 
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While these graphs appear to support the claims of Murray et al. that court-
ordered reform decreases the level of inequality within a state, they do not suggest that 
reform encourages higher expenditures.  Expenditures appear to be going up over time in 
all states, but there are no obvious jumps in spending after reform is ordered.  While these 
graphs represent only a rough first cut at the data, they do not support the proposition that 
expenditures increase after reform. 
Considering the changes in expenditures that occur in a state after court-ordered 
reform takes a little more care than the Gini coefficient as there is a secular increase in 
real education expenditures over time.  Table 3.3 reports how the percentage increase in 
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real expenditures in a state for the panel immediately after court-ordered reform differs 
from the average percentage increase in those states without reform over that same period 
of time. 
Table 3.3 – Percent Change in Real Expenditures 
Immediately after Court-Ordered Reform 
 
Percent Change in Real Expenditures 
Immediately after Court-Ordered Reform, 
Compared to States without Reform 
Number of States 
No change or decrease of up to 16 % 6 
Increase between 0 and 10 % 7 
Increase between 10 and 16 % 5 
Increase greater than 30 % 1 
 
Six of the states had a change in real expenditures immediately after reform that was 
actually less than that of those states without court-ordered reform.  Twelve states had an 
increase that was on the order of 0 to 20%, accounting for the average change in states 
without reform.  Kentucky had the largest relative increase in expenditures at 30.1%  As 
a point of reference, real expenditures in states without court-ordered reform on average 
increased by 13.4% between each data panel.  Thus more of these states have an increase 
in expenditures that is greater than the average in states without reform, but it is by no 
means a guarantee that expenditures increase. 
Murray et al.’s model includes state and year fixed effects, as well as the Reform 
indicator variable.  The coefficient on Reform is negative and statistically significant in 
the Gini (inequality) regression.  They also find that their results persist after a set of 
demographic variables are included, namely “the within-state, between-district standard 
deviations of the following variables: log household income, log school enrollment, the 
proportion of the population that is black, the fraction of households with children of 
school age, the fraction of adults without a high school degree, the fraction of adults with 
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a high school degree, and the fraction of the population in poverty” (802). Their results 
with state and year effects, as well as with other explanatory variables, can be found in 
Table 3.4 below (standard errors are reported in parentheses below the coefficients).  
Only results with the Gini coefficient are reported as the results from the other inequality 
measures are so similar.  It should be noted that when Murray et al. exclude state fixed 
effects from their equation, the Reform coefficient drops dramatically, which they say 
indicates that those states with the most inequality were the ones who were most likely to 
have court-ordered reform. 
Table 3.4 — Results from Murray et al. 
Effect of Reform on Gini Coefficient 
 
 
 
State and Year 
Fixed Effects 
 
State and Year 
Fixed Effects,  
and other 
Explanatory 
Variables 
State Effects 
 
Court-Ordered 
Refrom 
 
 
    -0.0161 ** 
(0.0040) 
 
    -0.0167 ** 
(0.0055) 
  -0.007 † 
(0.004) 
 
R2 
 
0.787 0.795 N/A 
** Significant at the 0.01 level 
* Significant at the 0.05 level 
† Significant at the 0.10 level 
 
I start with the Murray et al. fixed effects model, including explanatory variables, 
and then add the two additional panels of data for 1997 and 2002.  As above, I report only 
regressions on the Gini coefficient because the results with other inequality measures are 
so similar.  The formula for the Gini coefficient is, “the average difference in resources 
between any pair of school districts relative to the average resources for all districts in a 
state” (Murray et al., 797).  One potential disadvantage of the Gini coefficient is that it is 
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normally used as a measure of income inequality, and so it gives a somewhat compressed 
measure of inequality of education expenditures as they do not vary as much as income.  
However, my results are consistent across the different measures of inequality, and so it 
is appropriate to use the Gini coefficient here. The control variables which I include are 
similar to those of Murray et al., but they have been selected to provide a better 
explanation of education expenditures.  They are as follows: 
• A measure of citizen ideology for each state and for each year produced by Berry 
et al. (1998, 2004).  The Berry et al. measure of ideology is on a scale from 0 to 
100 with lower values indicating a more conservative state.  I hypothesize that 
more-liberal states place higher importance on both equality and adequacy in 
public education and so will have more equality in education finance as indicated 
by a positive coefficient.  
• Real per capita income.  My hypothesis is that states with higher per capita 
income have very wealthy school districts that are able to spend a great deal on 
public education, thereby increasing the level of inequality in the state’s education 
finance system. 
• The percent of the state’s public school teachers covered under a collective 
bargaining agreement (teacher unionization).  States with more of their teachers 
under a collective bargaining agreement are hypothesized to have more equality 
in their education expenditures as the unions will most likely have negotiated 
fairly uniform contracts, thereby equalizing school district spending on teacher 
salaries (a large component of school expenditures). 
• An indicator variable for those states that, under Section 5 of the 1965 Voting 
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Rights Act, must obtain preclearance from the United States Department of 
Justice before any changes in their voting regulations because of a history of 
voting discrimination.  The concept for this indicator is taken from Ueda (2005).  
Ueda shows that because these states experienced increased minority 
representation due to the elimination of multimember districts and creation of 
majority-minority districts, they also had a corresponding increase in equality in 
education spending across black and white school districts.  Therefore it is 
predicted that these states will have more spending equality.  Ueda included 
Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, South Carolina, and Virginia, and in 
addition to these, Arizona and Texas are also included as preclearance states after 
1975, when they were also covered under the law (United States Department of 
Justice 2007).   
• Many authors, including Murray et al., also include an explanatory variable which 
in some way measures the percent of the population in a state that belongs to a 
racial or ethnic minority.  Such a variable was considered for inclusion in these 
regressions.  The percent of the population that is black was considered as a 
possible measure.  The difficulty is that this measure is highly correlated with the 
states that are under federal preclearance, as explained above (the correlation is 
0.64).  Because of this high correlation, it is not appropriate to include both 
variables in the same regression.  The percent of the population that is of Hispanic 
origin was also considered, but a measure that is consistent over time is not 
available.  In particular, the United States Census Bureau did not code for ethnic 
origin before 1990, and so there is not a reliable measure.  But as explained, the 
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preclearance indicator is highly correlated with these percentages and so does 
account for race or ethnic variance across the states.  While the preclearance 
indicator and percent black have similar effects in the regression results, I decided 
to use the preclearance indicator because of the theoretical foundation for its 
inclusion as explained by Ueda. 
I was also concerned that specifying state fixed effects might be problematic with 
so few panels of data and thus such a small number of observations.    There is also the 
standard concern with fixed effects in that using this method will to some degree 
eliminate the variability between states as measured by the included explanatory 
variables, and so the impact of those explanatory variables will not be fully realized in a 
fixed effects model.  Of course the reason for including fixed effects is that they account 
for any variation across states that has not been measured by the explanatory variables.  
Given the costs and benefits of including fixed effects in the regression model, 
regressions in which just fixed year effects were specified along with the reform indicator 
and explanatory variables are also included.   
My results are quite similar to those of Murray et al., as shown below in Table 
3.5, as the coefficient of Reform is negative and significant for each inequality measure.  
The size of the coefficient, however, decreases as the new panels of data are added.  I 
also find, as did they, that when state fixed effects are excluded, the size of the reform 
variable coefficient drops substantially.   
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Table 3.5 – Determinants of Inequality in Per-Pupil Expenditures 
 
 
1972 – 1992, 
State and Year 
Fixed Effects 
 
1972 – 1992, 
Year Fixed 
Effects Only 
 
1972 – 2002, 
State and Year 
Fixed Effects 
1972 – 2002, 
Year Fixed 
Effects Only 
 
Court-
Ordered 
Reform  
 
    -0.0235 ** 
(0.0037) 
    -0.0154 ** 
(0.0046) 
    -0.0115 ** 
(0.0026) 
 -0.0067 * 
(0.0033) 
Ideology   -0.000323 * (0.000144) 
0.000176 
(0.000123) 
  -0.000220 * 
(0.000106) 
0.000082 
(0.000099) 
Real Per 
Capita Income 
(thousands of 
dollars) 
-0.00017 
(0.00103) 
     0.00289 ** 
(0.00081) 
0.000049 
(0.007074) 
     0.00229 ** 
(0.00059) 
Teacher 
Unionization 
-0.00947 
(0.00603) 
    -0.0135 * 
(0.00600) 
-0.00616 
(0.00538) 
  -0.0093 † 
(0.0050) 
Federal 
Supervision N/A 
-0.0014 
 (0.0051) N/A 
-0.0024 
 (0.0043) 
Constant      0.105 ** (0.021) 
   0.0236 † 
(0.0136) 
     0.0851 ** 
(0.0174) 
0.0187 
(0.0118) 
 
R2 
 
0.813 0.110 0.791 0.148 
N 230 230 322 322 
** Significant at the 0.01 level 
* Significant at the 0.05 level 
† Significant at the 0.10 level 
When state effects are included, the coefficient of the Berry et al. ideology 
measure is negative and significant, indicating that the more-liberal states have more 
equality in their education finance systems.  Per capita income is positive and significant 
when state effects are excluded, which supports the hypothesis that wealthier states tend 
to have more inequality.  Teacher unionization is negative and significant when state 
effects are excluded, as predicted.  The coefficient of the federal supervision indicator is 
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negative, which matches the hypothesis that these states have more equality in education 
expenditures due to increased minority representation, but it is not significant.   
The strength of these results generally decreases with the addition of more panels, 
but all in all it appears that state policymakers are positively responsive to the courts.  
The funding systems that replace those found unconstitutional result in more equality in 
expenditures across school districts. 
 I next turn to Murray et al.’s results concerning per-pupil revenues.  In a 
regression model that includes state and year effects (with no other explanatory 
variables), their results indicate that court-ordered reform increases per-pupil education 
revenues by $442 (in 1992 dollars), with a standard error of 152 (Evans et al. 1997).  In 
another regression on per-capita spending on K-12 education which includes the 
explanatory variables as well as state and year effects, they still find that the coefficient 
of Reform is positive and significant.  Here court-ordered reform increases per-capita 
spending on education by $88, with a standard error of 21.  Unlike in their regression 
analysis of measures of inequality, in this case they do not consider how their results 
change when state effects are excluded.   
 My regressions are based on per-pupil (based on average daily attendance) 
education expenditures, also in 1992 dollars.  Revenue and expenditure figures are of 
course quite similar, but the controversy over educational funding is primarily concerned 
with expenditures.  Again I start with regressions that include data through the 1992 
panel, and then expand the data through the 2002 panel.  Regressions with both state and 
year effects and just year effects are also included to match the analysis on inequality.    
The explanatory variables which are included are similar to those above, with a couple of 
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additions, as listed below:   
• The Berry et al. measure of citizen ideology for each state and for each year.  
More-liberal states are hypothesized to place higher importance on public 
education and so have higher education expenditures.  
• Real per capita income (in thousands of dollars).  I hypothesize that states with 
higher per capita income are able to spend more on public education and thus will 
have higher education expenditures. 
• The percent of the state’s public school teachers covered under a collective 
bargaining agreement (teacher unionization).  I predict that states with more of 
their teachers under a collective bargaining agreement will spend more on 
education as the teachers’ unions negotiate higher salaries (which compose a large 
part of education expenditures). 
• An indicator variable for those states under preclearance from the United States 
Department of Justice before any changes can be made in voting regulations.  I 
believe that these states will have higher education expenditures as they have 
increased minority representation who will have worked not just for equality in 
education spending, but also for an increase in spending.   
• The percent of the population that is school age (5 to 17).  When a state has a 
relatively large percent of the population that is school age, it places an extra 
strain on the public education system.  If there are sudden increases in the number 
of children, the school system may not be able to quickly adjust to these changes.  
Therefore it is expected that the percent of the population that is school age will 
have a negative effect on per-pupil expenditures. 
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• The percent of the population that is over age 65.  Having a relatively large 
proportion of the population that is over age 65 also places strains on a state’s 
finance system as this is a demographic that typically has large demands for social 
services.  It is my hypothesis that having a large percentage of the population that 
is over 65 will drive down education expenditures. 
Results from these regressions are shown below in Table 3.6. 
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Table 3.6 – Determinants of Per-Pupil Expenditures 
 
 
1972 – 1992, 
State and Year 
Fixed Effects 
 
1972 – 1992, 
Year Fixed 
Effects Only 
 
1972 – 2002, 
State and Year 
Fixed Effects 
1972 – 2002, 
Year Fixed 
Effects Only 
 
Court-
Ordered 
Reform  
 
     459 ** 
(113) 
175 
(117) 
     221 ** 
(85) 
113 
  (97) 
Ideology -2.35 (4.37) 
     16.6 ** 
  (3.2) 
  -6.08 † 
(3.50) 
   18.2 ** 
(3.1) 
Real Per 
Capita Income 
(thousands of 
dollars) 
     256 ** 
 (42) 
   278 ** 
(30) 
   210 **  
(24) 
    233 ** 
(22) 
Teacher 
Unionization 
 -9.1 
(180.8) 
 147 
(162) 
  33 
(176) 
227 
(152) 
Federal 
Supervision N/A 
   229 † 
(130) N/A 
183  
(126) 
Percent of 
Population  
5 – 17 
  -89.6 † 
(46.2) 
37.5 
(41.8) 
   -131 ** 
(33) 
-27.4 
 (36.6) 
Percent of 
Population 
Over 65 
85.3 
(61.4) 
   63.6 * 
(29.2) 
   90.1 * 
(45.4) 
   58.9 * 
(26.6) 
Constant 1010 (2020) 
  -2510 † 
(1500) 
   3020 * 
(1280) 
-368 
(1262) 
 
R2 
 
0.950 0.832 0.956 0.855 
N 230 230 322 322 
** Significant at the 0.01 level 
* Significant at the 0.05 level 
† Significant at the 0.10 level 
 
 As Table 3.6 shows, the regression with panels through 1992 which includes state 
and year fixed effects yield results that are remarkably similar to those of Murray et al.  
They found that court-ordered reform increases per-pupil revenue by $442, and I find that 
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court-ordered reform increases per-pupil expenditures by $459.  The other regression 
models, however, raise concerns about the robustness of these results.  When state effects 
are excluded, the impact of reform is still positive, but it is much smaller and no longer 
significant.  Also, even with state effects, once the two additional panels of data are 
included in the regression, the effect of court-ordered reform is reduced by half and is 
only $221. 
 The other explanatory variables which are included in these regressions also 
affect per-pupil expenditures.  The Berry et al. ideology measure provides mixed results 
in these regressions.  When state effects are excluded, it is positive and significant, 
indicating that more-liberal states spend more on public education, again as expected.  In 
the regression that includes state effects and panels through 2002, the Berry et al. 
ideology measure is actually negative and significant, a result which is difficult to 
understand.  Per capita income is positive and significant regardless of the specification, 
supporting the hypothesis that wealthier states spend more on education.5   
 Teacher unionization has no significant impact on per-pupil expenditures.  
Federal intervention is positive and significant in the regression with panels through 1992 
without state effects, matching the hypothesis that these states spend more on education 
because of an increase in minority representation.  While the coefficient is still positive in 
the regression with panels through 2002, the effect is no longer significant.  Those states 
with a large percentage of the population that is school age spend significantly less per-
                                                 
5 Property values, as reflected in housing prices, were also considered as a measure of a state’s wealth, but 
they were found to be highly correlated with per capita income, and so were not included as an explanatory 
variable. 
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pupil in the regressions with state effects.  This result is as predicted, as there may be 
more of a strain on the education finance system in these states because of the large 
number of children which they must educate or their inability to fully adjust to any surges 
in school enrollment.  The coefficient of the percent of the population that is over 65 is 
positive and significant in three of the regression models.  This result is somewhat 
surprising as it runs counter to the initial hypothesis, and this deserves further 
consideration in the future. 
 The regression results presented in Tables 3.5 and 3.6 provide some support for 
the work of Murray et al., but they also raise questions.  Their findings that court-ordered 
reform decreases inequality within a state’s education finance system are supported in all 
of the regressions on the Gini coefficient.  The size of the improvement in the level of 
equality seems to have diminished over time, but it is still significant.  The regression 
results on per-pupil expenditures tell a different story, however.  Their result that court-
ordered reform increases spending on education is not robust.  The model is very 
sensitive to specification, with the effect on expenditures greatly decreasing with the 
addition of two panels of data and disappearing all together once state effects are 
excluded.  An explanation for these findings is presented in the next section. 
 
The Endogeneity of Reform    
 A major source of concern with the analysis in Murray et al. is that they do not 
allow for the possibility that reform is actually a matter of political choice, and thus 
endogenous.  When making decisions to change the existing system of education finance, 
the courts are looking at current conditions in the state. The legislature may also have a 
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fair amount of discretion in choosing how they will respond.  Often the court is itself part 
of the political process within the state.  Unlike federal justices, justices for state courts 
are often elected or are subject to regular reviews.  In that case, the state court justices 
would be more likely to consider the political atmosphere of a state than a federal justice 
who is isolated from politics. 
 Once a decision for reform has been issued by a state court, it is then up to the 
legislature to implement the changes in the education finance system.  This is again a 
political process, and the legislators are almost certainly going to be swayed by their own 
ideological beliefs as well as those of their constituents.  Work by Gerber et al. (2000) 
and Kiewiet and Szakaly (1996) shows that state legislatures often find ways around 
restrictions which have been imposed upon them, such as constitutional borrowing and 
spending limits and ballot initiatives.  Imposing reforms on a legislature which was 
previously unwilling to improve equality of its own accord may not be an effective way 
to produce the large changes in education finance that had been hoped for by reformers.  
It is therefore appropriate to treat court-ordered reform as an endogenous variable rather 
than as an exogenous constraint that is being forced upon a system of education finance.   
 This approach differs from that of others who have used litigation to determine 
the impact of public policy reform.  For example, Levitt (1996) notes that it is difficult to 
measure the effect of the size of the prison population on the crime rate because of the 
simultaneity of the two measures.  In order to measure the true impact, Levitt uses court 
orders requiring reform in the prison system because of unacceptable levels of 
overcrowding as an instrument for a shift in the number of prisoners.  Levitt treats these 
decisions as exogenous to the state’s prison system, but a key concern is that the litigation 
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would not have been necessary had the prisons not already been overcrowded.  Thus the 
concern with Levitt’s use of the court cases as an exogenous variable parallels the 
concern over education finance court-orders being considered exogenous; even a court 
ruling is itself a function of a state’s political system, as well as the conditions of the 
system which is being forced to change. 
The question is then how to implement Reform as an endogenous variable 
econometrically.  There are two primary concerns.  The first is that in a two-stage 
regression in which Reform is predicted in the first stage using instruments, a binary 
variable is being predicted in order to be used in the second stage regression.  Normally 
ordinary least squares would not be appropriate in such a case, but Angrist and Krueger 
(2001) provide an answer.  Rather than using probit or a similar model to predict a binary 
variable, they recommend using linear regression for consistent estimates, as this will 
produce consistent second-stage estimates, even though the endogenous variable is 
binary.  Trying to use probit or another such model in the first stage would actually be 
likely to produce inconsistent estimates, and therefore this method is not preferable.  
Thus two-stage least squares will be the approach used in the regression analysis below. 
 The second question is, what instruments should be used to predict reform?  
Several potential variables were considered.  The first was the level of inequality within a 
state.  As indicated by Murray et al., it seems probable that those states with high levels 
of inequality in their education finance systems would be the ones more likely to have 
court-ordered reform.  In order to test the level of inequality as a potential instrument, 
Table 3.7 shows Reform regressed on the Gini coefficient, along with other explanatory 
variables.  Again while OLS would normally not be correct, because I am considering 
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potential instruments in two-stage regressions where the first stage will be OLS, it is 
appropriate to consider it here. 
Table 3.7 – Gini Coefficient as a Potential Instrument for Reform 
Year Effects Only Model 
 
Variable Regression Coefficient 
Gini coefficient  -2.26 * (0.97) 
Ideology 0.00012 (0.00179) 
Deflated Per Capita Income 
(thousands of dollars) 
     0.0737 ** 
(0.0126) 
Teacher Unionization    -0.530 ** (0.084) 
Federal Supervision    -0.318 ** (0.071) 
Percent of Population 5 – 17    0.0461 * (0.0213) 
Percent of Population Over 65 0.0217 (0.0155) 
Constant   -1.88 * (0.73) 
R2 0.257 
N 322 
** Significant at the 0.01 level 
* Significant at the 0.05 level 
† Significant at the 0.10 level 
 
 As shown in Table 3.7, the Gini coefficient does not have the predicted effect on 
Reform.  Instead of the expected positive coefficient which would indicate that the most 
unequal states are likely to have reform, the coefficient is negative and significant.  
However, this does match with the regression results from above which indicate that 
court-ordered reform decreases the level of inequality within a state’s education finance 
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system.  What the regression in Table 3.7 is then showing is that the states that have had 
reform imposed by the courts have a lower Gini coefficient, rather than showing that the 
Gini coefficient was higher in these states before they had reform.  Because this 
regression is not able to provide a prediction for Reform, it would therefore be 
inappropriate to use the Gini coefficient as an instrument for Reform. 
 The next likely candidate for an instrument looks to the political system of each 
state.  Every state constitution has a section or clause that refers to the provision of public 
education.  When a court orders education finance reform, it is looking at how the current 
education finance system matches against the requirements for the provision of public 
education as described in the state constitution.  It therefore seems appropriate to consider 
how these state constitution education clauses might influence the likelihood of a state to 
have court-ordered reform.  
 There is great variety in the education clauses that are found in the state 
constitutions.  For instance, in 1998 Florida passed a constitutional amendment which 
makes their clause one of the most demanding in the nation: 
The education of children is a fundamental value of the people of the State 
of Florida. It is, therefore, a paramount duty of the state to make adequate 
provision for the education of all children residing within its borders. 
Adequate provision shall be made by law for a uniform, efficient, safe, 
secure, and high quality system of free public schools that allows students 
to obtain a high quality education and for the establishment, maintenance, 
and operation of institutions of higher learning and other public education 
programs that the needs of the people may require.  (Florida Constitution, 
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Article IX, § 1) 
The Maine constitution represents the other extreme in that it requires no monetary effort 
from the state government for the provision of public education: 
A general diffusion of the advantages of education being essential to the 
preservation of the rights and liberties of the people; to promote this 
important object, the Legislature are authorized, and it shall be their duty 
to require, the several towns to make suitable provision, at their own 
expense, for the support and maintenance of public schools ... (Maine 
Constitution, Article VIII, § 1) 
These differences in the strength of the education clauses allows for their 
categorization according to the demands they place upon the state government.  A full 
list of these clauses, along with how they are categorized, can be found in Appendix B: 
State Constitution Education Clauses.  States were coded as having weak clauses if they 
only require the establishment of a system of public education without any other 
qualifications.  Others were coded as having strong clauses if they include words such as 
an “efficient” or “uniform” education system, with the belief that clauses with these 
phrases indicate that some level of equality in expenditures is required.  All other states 
were coded as having constitutional clauses of intermediate strength as they include 
phrases which suggest that some minimal level of financial involvement from the state 
government is required, with words such as “maintain” or “support.”  The belief is that 
stronger constitutional clauses will make court-ordered reform more likely as the court 
will have grounds to demand a certain level of equality or adequacy from the state 
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legislature based upon the state’s education clause.6  To test the strength of state 
constitution clauses as an instrument for Reform, Table 3.8 below shows Reform 
regressed on the indicators for education clause strength, along with other explanatory 
variables.  The indicator for weak clauses is the omitted dummy variable. 
                                                 
6 McUsic (1991) also codes the strength of state constitution education clauses and considers their use in 
education finance litigation.  Her article was before many of the important cases of the 1990s took place 
and so focused more on the potential of these clauses in supporting the cause of court-ordered education 
finance reform.  I created my own coding system in order to test for the usefulness of these clauses as an 
instrument for Reform.  
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Table 3.8 – Strength of State Constitution Education Clauses  
as Potential Instrument for Reform: 
Year Effects Only Model 
 
Variable Regression Coefficient 
Strong Clause -0.082   (0.067) 
Intermediate Clause 0.023 (0.042) 
Ideology -0.0024  (0.0018) 
Real Per Capita Income 
(thousands of dollars) 
     0.069 ** 
(0.012) 
Teacher Unionization    -0.526 ** (0.085) 
Federal Supervision    -0.322 ** (0.072) 
Percent of Population 5 – 17    0.039 † (0.021) 
Percent of Population Over 65 0.018 (0.016) 
Constant   -1.71 * (0.74) 
R2 0.250 
N 322 
** Significant at the 0.01 level 
* Significant at the 0.05 level 
† Significant at the 0.10 level 
 
 Once again the regression does not have the predicted results.  The coefficient of 
the indicator for strong clauses is negative and insignificant rather than positive.  The 
coefficient for the intermediate clause is positive, but also insignificant.  Thus stronger 
education clauses apparently do not make court-ordered reform more likely.  What may 
instead be the case is that legislatures in those states with strict education clauses are 
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more likely to already be following the strict guidelines which they are given in the 
constitution, and so court-ordered reform may not be as necessary.  In any case, because 
the mechanism at work here is not understood, it would also be inappropriate to use the 
strength of the education clause as an instrumental variable for Reform. 
 The third candidate for an instrument also falls within the political system.  In this 
case I consider the justices who are making the decision to order reform.  The state court 
justices are in fact part of the political system which they are affecting.  In many states 
justices are elected, sometimes in partisan elections.  In other states justices are appointed 
by the legislature or governor, another process which certainly has partisan overtones.  
The justices also bring their own ideology to their judgments, either more conservative or 
more liberal, and this is of course expected to play a role in their decision-making. 
 There are several variables which can be used as instruments in order to account 
for the politics of the judiciary.  The first is a measure of the ideology of the state court 
justices.  Langer (2006) has created a data set which includes the ideology of every 
justice on each state supreme court (or court of last resort) from 1970 to 2005, based on a 
scale of 0 to 100 (like that of Berry et al.), with 0 being the most conservative, and 100 
the most liberal.  The Langer data set also includes the ideology of the median justice in 
each year in each state.  Given that the median is typically considered to be the pivotal 
justice, this variable seems the most appropriate to use to measure the attitude of the court 
toward ordering education finance reform.  The expectation is that more-liberal courts 
will look more favorably upon reform. 
 The next variable is the method by which justices are selected for the court.  The 
various ways in which justices are chosen are partisan and nonpartisan elections, 
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gubernatorial appointment, legislative appointment, and merit selection through a 
nonpartisan nominating commission (American Judicature Society 2006).  Clearly some 
of these methods will involve partisan politics, while others are structured so as to 
purposely exclude such politicking.  It is predicted that those justices that are protected 
from partisan politics in the method of their selection will be more likely to overturn a 
state’s system as they are not concerned with pleasing the political actors or citizens 
within their state.  Thus another instrument for Reform is an indicator for those methods 
of judicial selection which are part partisan in nature, namely partisan elections, 
gubernatorial appointment, and legislative appointment.  It is expected that these states 
will be less likely to have court-ordered reform. 
 Given the inclusion of variables for judicial ideology and method of selection, it is 
also natural to consider the interaction of these two variables.  Perhaps there is a 
combination of these two effects which also impacts the likelihood of Reform.  For 
instance, it is possible that liberal justices who were appointed through a partisan process 
feel pressure to order reform because such a change to the education finance system 
matches with the ideological beliefs of those actors who placed them in the judiciary.  For 
this reason an interaction between the median justice ideology and indicator for a partisan 
method of judicial selection will also be included. 
Finally, it is also the case that in some states a vote by a supermajority of justices 
is needed in order to overturn the state’s system of education finance.  Such a barrier to 
reform would make court-ordered reform less likely.  Therefore, an indicator variable for 
those states which require a supermajority of justices to overturn the education finance 
 
 65
system is included, and those states are Nebraska, North Dakota, and South Carolina 
(Caminker 2003).   
To test the strength of these four variables as instruments for Reform, Table 3.9 
below shows Reform regressed on the variables which represent the politics of the 
judiciary and income inequality, along with the other explanatory variables.   
Table 3.9 – Judiciary Variables and Income Inequality 
as Potential Instruments for Reform: 
Year Effects Only Model 
 
Variable Regression Coefficient 
Median Justice Ideology 0.00089 (0.00185) 
Partisan Judicial Selection -0.170   (0.111) 
Median Justice Ideology * 
 Partisan Selection 
     0.0061 ** 
(0.0022) 
Supermajority Requirement -0.115  (0.079) 
Ideology -0.0036  (0.0024) 
Real Per Capita Income 
(thousands of dollars) 
     0.0524 ** 
(0.0098) 
Teacher Unionization     -0.434 ** (0.082) 
Federal Supervision    -0.303 ** (0.071) 
Constant   -0.345 † (0.200) 
R2 0.281 
N 322 
** Significant at the 0.01 level 
* Significant at the 0.05 level 
† Significant at the 0.10 level 
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 The table shows that in this regression the variables do have the predicted effect 
on Reform.  While not significant, the median justice ideology has the predicted positive 
coefficient, as it is expected that more-liberal justices are more likely to order reform.  
The indicator for a partisan judicial selection method, while not significant, has a 
negative coefficient, which most likely indicates that justices selected through a partisan 
process will be less willing to rule against an education system that is also a result of the 
current political atmosphere within the state, especially as they may fear reprisal for an 
unpopular decision.  The interaction term between median justice ideology and partisan 
selection is positive and significant.  This result indicates that when liberal justices are 
the product of a partisan selection method, they may feel they have more freedom to act 
on their inclination to order education finance reform.  Finally, the coefficient of the 
requirement for a supermajority of justices is not significant, but it is negative, which 
matches the belief that ordering reform will be more difficult in these states.  Thus this 
set of variables matches the theory behind what will make court-ordered reform more 
likely, and they will therefore be used as the instruments in two-stage regressions which 
consider the impact of reform upon education inequality and expenditures. 
 The effect upon Reform of the other explanatory variables in Table 3.9 should 
also be noted.  The ideology of the state has no significant impact on the likelihood of 
reform, but wealthier states are more likely to have had court-ordered reform.  The level 
of teacher unionization makes reform less likely, perhaps because strong teacher unions 
in some way level the playing field so that the courts are not forced to intervene.  States 
that are under federal supervision under the Voting Rights Act are also less likely to have 
had court-ordered reform, perhaps because they have already developed education policy 
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that takes into consideration concerns about perceptions of any inequality within the 
state.  
In considering the fit of this model for predicting court-ordered reform, it is also 
helpful to consider those data points for which the model is not a good fit.  A residual 
analysis gives some insight into the weaknesses of this model.  The largest residuals from 
this analysis fall into two categories: those states that were predicted to have reform but 
did not (large negative residuals), and those state that were not predicted to have reform 
but did (large positive residuals).  The first category includes California in 1972.  
According to the regression model, California was strongly predicted to have court-
ordered reform in this year.  This prediction is largely due to California having an 
extremely liberal median justice on a court that is selected through a partisan method.  
Since California is not coded as having court-ordered reform in 1972, this results in a 
large negative residual for this year.  Because California is coded as having reform in all 
other panels in the data set, the model provides a much better fit in all other years. 
In 2002 Colorado also has a high prediction for court-ordered reform, which 
results in a high residual since it has not had a court case.  In this instance it is the 
combination of a state that is relatively conservative, wealthy, and has a low percentage 
of teachers under collective bargaining agreements that work together to give a large 
prediction for reform.  In fact, a high level of per capita income is a strong predictor of 
whether a state has had court-ordered reform, and as income is increasing over time, this 
effect is stronger in later years.  Also of particular importance are those states that select 
their justices through a partisan process.  The coefficient of the interaction between the 
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median justice ideology and the partisan selection process is an important indicator and 
drives up the model’s prediction of whether a state has had court-ordered reform. 
On the other hand, Kansas and Washington are two states that have large positive 
residuals for several years in the model.  In this case these states have a very low level of 
predicted reform, and yet Kansas had court-ordered reform by the 1977 panel, and 
Washington had reform by the 1982 panel.  These are both states which are not 
particularly wealthy or partisan, nor do they have a partisan judicial selection method, 
and so they do not have any particular indicators for reform.  Thus the early reform in 
these two states leads to large residuals. 
The model does well at predicting reform in states such as California and New 
Jersey, which had extremely liberal courts selected through partisan methods in 1972 and 
were also two of the earliest states to have court-ordered education finance reform.  
States such as Kansas and Washington, which do not have such strong indicators, do not 
fit as well.  The overall model fits well enough that these results from the regression in 
Table 3.9 will next be used to analyze the effect of court-ordered reform on inequality 
and expenditures. 
 
A Second Look at the Impact of Court-Ordered Reform 
 In the previous section I carefully considered the endogenous nature of court-
ordered reform and determined that variables for the political nature of the judiciary, as 
well as a measure of the income inequality within a state, make appropriate instruments 
for predicting Reform.  I will now use these instruments in two-stage regressions on the 
level of inequality and expenditures in state education finance systems in order to 
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determine the impact of court-ordered reform on these measures.  As explained above, as 
recommended by Angrist and Krueger, linear regression will be used in both stages of 
these estimates.  The explanatory variables included in each regression will be the same 
as those used above in the regressions that expanded the work of Murray et al.  The first 
regression is on the Gini coefficient, which again measures the level of inequality within 
a state’s education finance system.  The results for the first stage are the same as those 
presented in Table 3.9, and so only the second stage is reported in Table 3.10 below. 
Table 3.10 – Two-Stage Regression on Gini Coefficient: 
Year Effects Only Model 
 
Second Stage 
Variable Regression Coefficient 
Court-Ordered 
Reform  
 -0.0261 † 
(0.0142) 
Ideology 0.000071 (0.000105) 
Real Per Capita Income 
(thousands of dollars) 
     0.0033 ** 
(0.0010) 
Teacher Unionization   -0.0183 * (0.0083) 
Federal Supervision -0.0086   (0.0063) 
Constant 0.0102 (0.0138) 
R2 0.054 
N 322 
** Significant at the 0.01 level 
* Significant at the 0.05 level 
† Significant at the 0.10 level 
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 The results from this two-stage regression on the Gini coefficient support the 
previous findings on the effect of court-ordered reform on the level of inequality in 
education finance.  That is, court-ordered reform significantly decreases the level of 
inequality within an education finance system.  In fact, the coefficient of Reform is now 
larger than it was in the previous regressions that did not account for the endogenous 
nature of court-ordered reform.  The results presented in Table 3.10 show that court-
ordered reform decreases the Gini coefficient by about 0.0261, while the regression 
results in Table 3.5, which include state and year fixed effects and panels through 2002, 
show that reform decreases the Gini coefficient by only 0.0115.  In order to understand 
the magnitude of these figures, it is helpful to consider that in 2002, the average Gini 
coefficient in those states that had not had court-ordered reform was about 0.0644.  Thus 
a change in the Gini coefficient of 0.0261 would represent an almost 41% decrease in 
inequality, while a change of 0.0115 would represent only an 18% decrease in inequality.  
Accounting for the endogenous nature of court-ordered reform therefore not only 
supports the findings that reform decreases the level of inequality in education 
expenditures, but it has also strengthened the degree of the impact. 
 The other explanatory variables included in the two-stage regression also have the 
expected effects.  Ideology does not have a significant impact on inequality, but again 
wealthier states tend to have higher inequality.  Teacher unionization again has a negative 
and significant effect on the Gini coefficient, as would be predicted if the union 
agreements promote equality in spending.  The indicator for federal supervision under the 
Voting Rights Act is not significant but does have a negative coefficient, providing some 
indication that increased minority representation improves equality in spending. 
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 I next turn to the question of the impact of court-ordered reform on the level of 
education expenditures.  Table 3.11 below shows the results of a two-stage linear 
regression on per-pupil expenditures.  
Table 3.11 – Two-Stage Regression on Per-Pupil Expenditures: 
Year Effects Only Model 
 
First Stage 
Variable Regression Coefficient 
Median Justice Ideology 0.00089 (0.00185) 
Partisan Judicial Selection -0.159   (0.111) 
Median Justice Ideology * 
 Partisan Selection 
     0.0061 ** 
(0.0022) 
Supermajority Requirement -0.118  (0.079) 
Ideology -0.0031  (0.0024) 
Real Per Capita Income 
(thousands of dollars) 
     0.0682 ** 
(0.0121) 
Teacher Unionization     -0.481 ** (0.085) 
Federal Supervision    -0.304 ** (0.072) 
Percent of Population 5 – 17    0.0475 * (0.0208) 
Percent of Population Over 65 0.0211 (0.0152) 
Constant     -1.86 ** (0.72) 
R2 0.293 
N 322 
** Significant at the 0.01 level 
* Significant at the 0.05 level 
† Significant at the 0.10 level 
 
 72
Second Stage 
Variable Regression Coefficient 
Court-Ordered Reform  80 (381) 
Ideology    18.2 ** (3.1) 
Real Per Capita Income 
(thousands of dollars) 
   235 ** 
(33) 
Teacher Unionization 210 (241) 
Federal Supervision 173  (173) 
Percent of Population 5 – 17 -26.1   (39.3) 
Percent of Population Over 65    59.5 * (27.3) 
Constant -425 (1406) 
R2 0.855 
N 322 
** Significant at the 0.01 level 
* Significant at the 0.05 level 
† Significant at the 0.10 level 
 
 The results from this two-stage regression on per-pupil expenditures indicate that 
that court-ordered reform has no significant impact on the level of expenditures.  The 
coefficient of Reform is positive, but it is smaller than in any previous regression on per-
pupil expenditures, and it is certainly not significant.  The results presented in Table 3.11 
show that court-ordered reform at best might increase per-pupil expenditures by about 
$80 a year.  In 2002 average per-pupil expenditures in those states that have not had 
court-ordered reform were about $6310 (in 1992 dollars).  A generous assumption that 
reform would increase spending by $80 would therefore represent an increase in 
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expenditures of about 1.3%.  Accounting for the endogenous nature of court-ordered 
reform has therefore eliminated any impact that this reform might have on per-pupil 
expenditures. 
 The other explanatory variables included in the two-stage regression generally 
have the expected effects.  More-liberal states are again shown to spend significantly 
more on education, as are wealthier states.  The level of teacher unionization once more 
has no impact on the level of expenditures, and the same is true for those states under 
federal supervision.  The percent of the population that is school age has no significant 
impact on expenditures, but states with a larger percentage of the population that is over 
65 are again shown to spend more on education. 
 
Summary 
 This chapter began with a consideration of the data on inequality and per-pupil 
expenditures across the 46 states in my sample.  Simple graphs of the data show that 
court-ordered reform does decrease the level of inequality in education expenditures 
within a state, but they do not reveal a clear pattern of what happens to the level of 
expenditures after reform.  Work by Murray et al. indicates that court-ordered reform 
decreases inequality and increases education spending.  However, their results are very 
sensitive to specification (specifically the inclusion of state effects), and the impact of 
reform decreases with the addition of two panels of data. 
 Another concern with the work by Murray et al. is that they do not account for the 
endogenous nature of court-ordered reform.  Much of the literature treats these court 
decisions as a change that has come from entirely outside the education finance system.  
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However, state court justices are often themselves appointed through a political process, 
and then the implementation of the reform is carried out by the state legislature, a body 
which is certainly not immune from political pressure.  In order to take into account the 
endogenous nature of reform, several potential instruments for the indicator variable 
Reform were considered.  Ultimately a combination of variables which account for the 
political nature of the judiciary were determined to be the appropriate instruments.   
 I then employed two-stage regressions with these instruments for Reform.  The 
regression on the Gini coefficient, which measures inequality within a state’s education 
finance system, showed that not only does court-ordered reform have a significant impact 
on equality, but that the size of this effect was larger than in previous regressions.  Court-
ordered reform might decrease the level of inequality by as much as 41%.  The results 
from the two-stage regression on per-pupil expenditures were quite different.  This 
regression showed that court-ordered reform has no significant impact on the level of per-
pupil expenditures.  A generous assumption would indicate that reform increases 
expenditures by about 1%, but even this result is not significant. 
 The analysis in this chapter has therefore shown that court-ordered reform does 
have an impact on a state’s education finance system, but not the one that has often been 
suggested in the literature.  Reform does improve equality, but it does not change the 
level of expenditures.  Why would this be the case?  Murray et al. say that after court-
ordered reform the state governments increase their financial support for public 
education, thereby raising the level of expenditures.  What would be the problem with 
this hypothesis?  The next chapter begins to provide the answer as it explores the history 
of education finance in the United States. 
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Chapter 4 
The Pre-Serrano History of Education Finance in the United States 
 The analysis in Chapter 3 showed that court-ordered education finance reform 
decreases inequality in education expenditures, but that it does not change the level of 
education spending.  Much of the literature on education finance reform has suggested, 
however, that the level of expenditures should increase after reform, as state governments 
allocate additional money for the support of public education.  This chapter provides a 
history of education finance in the United States so as to begin to explain why a 
significant increase in education expenditures was not forthcoming.  The story begins 
with the United States colonies. 
 
Education from Colonial Times to the Early Republic 
 Public education in the United States originates, not surprisingly, in the Protestant 
New England colonies.  The Puritans placed great value upon the ability of their children 
to be able to read the Bible.  This belief was so important that the Massachusetts Colony 
passed a law in 1642 requiring parents to ensure that their children were able to read and 
understand the basic tenets of law and religion.  The colonies of Connecticut, New York, 
and New Hampshire adopted similar laws (Cremin 1970).   
 While these laws required action from parents in order to educate their children, 
the towns of New England did little to actually provide schooling.  In Massachusetts the 
solution to this lax response came in 1647, with passage of the Old-Deluder Satan Act.  
This law required that the townships of the colony provide schools for their children.  
Specifically, towns with fifty families were to have a schoolmaster to teach all children to 
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read and write, while towns with one hundred families were required to have a grammar 
schoolmaster who could prepare children to attend university (Cremin 1970).  
Compliance with the Old-Deluder Satan Act and similar laws in other colonies was also 
lax, however, so schools were still far from universal in the New England colonies. 
 The New England schools that did exist would on occasion receive some public 
support, but generally students were charged for their attendance.  Often a town would 
publicly endow land or a building for a school, but parents who were able to pay tuition 
were required to do so.  Some of the poorest students would receive public support and 
be allowed to attend for free (Noble 1954).  This original model of expecting most 
parents to pay for education and providing a free education for only the most poverty-
stricken students became the norm and would be used throughout the United States for 
many years to come.  Over time the method of paying for town schools evolved, and in 
some areas parents whose children attended the local school began to be charged 
assessments, called rates.  Eventually a few towns even moved to supporting schools with 
a general property tax (Noble 1954, 128). 
 The New England towns were more than simply a governing arrangement — they 
were communities that were defined by religious and social ties.  This closeness and 
interdependence gave the townships the structure that was needed to overcome the 
collective action problem inherent in forming schools.  The settlers of the other American 
colonies did not have this same Puritan social capital, and for them education remained 
almost entirely a private affair.  In some cases the middle colonies were able to establish 
parochial schools, but the population of the southern colonies was generally so dispersed, 
as well as resistant to the idea of providing public goods, that few, if any, were publicly 
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provided (Meyer 1967). 
 By the beginning of the 18th Century, the strength of the New England 
communities began to fade.  With new immigrants came new Christian denominations, 
and they diluted the hold that the Puritan faith held over New England.  With the 
Enlightenment came interest in topics other than religion, but with the Great Awakening 
came a desire to return to the basics of faith (Noble 1954).  The district school was the 
result of the desire for change in the old system.  As Meyer (1967) says, “By this scheme 
a township arranged itself into districts, each with its own school, taught and patrolled by 
its own master, and each kept going by the disbursement the district made to the town 
treasurer” (50–51).  For the most part, though, wherever schools could be found, they 
were under the control of the churches.  As people no longer believed that it was the 
government’s role to mandate a certain religious education for children, parents would 
turn to their own private schools.  The children of poor parents were forced to rely upon 
charitable schools that were generally operated by church-based philanthropic 
organizations (Butts 1978). 
 During the Revolutionary War, the expense of fighting meant that there were 
fewer funds to support education (Meyer 1967).  However, the ideas of the Revolution 
would eventually support the idea of education for all children (Goldin and Katz 2003).  
If the people of the United States were going to govern themselves rather than be under 
the rule of a king, then they must be educated in order to perform this duty.  It is then an 
easy extension of this idea to say that the state should be responsible for this necessary 
education of its citizens (Noble 1954).  While education was not considered to be the job 
of the federal government, many of the new state constitutions did address the subject 
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and suggested the hope that education would become important in the new country.   
Some federal government support for public education was evident with the 
Ordinance of 1785, which required that a section of each new township in the Northwest 
Territory be reserved for the use of public schools (Butts 1978).  These are all indicators 
that a more general support for public education was forming.  By 1800, each New 
England state had passed laws mandating some form of education, generally by requiring 
towns to provide for schools (Meyer 1967, 129). 
 Once communities became more involved in funding public education, they 
employed several different mechanisms for raising revenue.  In general, though, they did 
not draw upon a property tax.  Instead, states allowed local governments to use special 
sources, such as licenses, taxes on liquor and billiard halls, and even lotteries.  Some 
states tried to create permanent school funds, but these were often mismanaged and rarely 
raised enough money to be of any use.  Seldom did a local community have a general tax 
to support public education (Meyer 1967 and Noble 1954).   
 These small efforts at funding public schools continued for a few decades, but the 
nation was preparing to turn its sentiment in favor of public education into action.  In 
previous years while the colonial or state governments may have given aid to help or 
promote education, they never actually accepted the responsibility for public education 
(Hazlett 1971).  The United States then experienced an extraordinary transformation from 
1830 to 1860.  Thanks to trains, steamboats, and telegraphs, the infrastructure of the 
country improved dramatically.  The nation also grew in size due to immigration, and the 
country’s population continued to move west.  All of these changes meant that commerce 
and trade were able to expand tremendously.  (Meyer 1967 and Noble 1954).   
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This transformation brought about another new feature for the country — a large 
middle class.  This group of citizens quickly realized that education was necessary for 
success in modern America.  They were willing to work to ensure that an education 
would be provided to all children, whether poor, wealthy, or even somewhere in-between, 
and their efforts came to be known as the Common School Movement (Meyer 1967 and 
Noble 1954).      
In many cases changes in the funding of public schools came about thanks to the 
work of a few dedicated individuals.  As was often the case, Massachusetts was once 
again a leader in education, thanks primarily to the dedicated labor of two men, James G. 
Carter and Horace Mann.  The two worked together to persuade the state legislature to 
form the state board of education.  Carter also helped to create an effective state school 
fund.  As the secretary of the state board of education, Mann then continued the work that 
had been started by Carter (Noble 1954).  Mann’s tireless efforts to persuade the state that 
its educational system was entirely inadequate are well-known.  By the time he was 
finished, funding for schools had greatly increased, and he had significantly improved the 
quality of education that students received (Meyer 1967).  Connecticut again followed the 
example set by Massachusetts thanks to the work of Thomas H. Gallaudet and Henry 
Barnard (Noble 1954).   
As men like these continued their fight for public education, change did happen as 
the country more and more saw the value of education.  Eventually general taxes were 
established, and they typically came about in the following sequence: 
(1) Permission granted to communities so desiring to organize a school taxing 
district, and to tax for school support the property of those consenting and 
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residing therein.  (2) General taxation of all property in the taxing district 
permitted by vote, regardless of individual consent.  (3) State aid to taxing 
districts, from the income from permanent school funds or from the proceeds 
of a small state tax or appropriation.  (4) Compulsory local taxation to 
supplement the state aid received.  (5) Often township or county taxation 
added, to supplement state and district sources.  (E. P. Cubberly, as quoted by 
Noble 1954, 186) 
As a matter of course, the major cities were often the leaders in establishing a system of 
schools.  They had the wealth and ability to institute property taxes to support public 
education, and over time the state government gave aid to encourage these efforts 
(Hazlett 1971). 
Thus it is clear that state aid became a major component of education finance 
during the Common School Movement.  State aid was often used as an incentive to 
encourage local communities to establish public schools.  As the states became more 
involved in financing the schools, they also gained more control over the system of 
education.  State government sought to ensure that its money was being spent wisely, and 
state superintendents were given the power of supervision (Meyer 1967).  It was also 
typical for states to mandate a local tax in order to be eligible to receive state aid, as well 
as for the state governments to require a certain minimum quality of education (Hazlett 
1971).  It should be noted that the South lagged behind the rest of the country in these 
developments, mainly because of their strong conservative beliefs, as well as a fear of 
educating slaves (Meyer 1967).   
 The Civil War slowed the advances that had been made in education up to 1860 
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(Noble 1954).  After the war, though, the demand for education continued to increase, 
and the system of public education continued to grow (Meyer 1967).  Public high schools 
became increasingly common.  While the quality of schools was often low, they were 
universal enough to produce a fairly literate citizenry, especially in the North and West 
(Noble 1954).  Thus by the end of the 19th Century, education in the United States had 
made great advances, and the country was now prepared to carry this momentum forward 
into the next chapter of educational progress. 
 
The High School Movement and Beyond 
 The turn of the 20th Century witnessed rapid growth in public education.  The 
High School Movement was especially key in the growth of education during the early 
1900s, and it became particularly strong after World War I.  Much like the Common 
School Movement the century before, the High School Movement was a push for the 
establishment of high schools throughout the country so that all students would have the 
opportunity to receive a secondary education.  The demand was similarly based on a 
realization of the importance and value of a high school degree in a society that was 
becoming more and more advanced (Goldin and Katz 2000).  High school degrees meant 
an opportunity for real advancement in the obtainment of a white-collar job.  The 
economy was now rewarding a knowledge of basic science, and businesses were 
interested in hiring workers with strong clerical abilities.  The nation was rapidly 
becoming less agrarian and more industrialized.  As communities wanted to build high 
schools in response to these dramatic changes, there was of course a need for increases in 
education funding.  Once again, while state aid was not a primary source of funding, it 
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did often serve as an incentive for communities to establish high schools (Goldin 2001, 
Goldin and Katz 2003). 
 What this chapter has then shown is that state governments have had a role in 
supporting public education for quite some time.  From the time of the Common School 
Movement forward, state governments have provided funding for the promotion of 
public education so that communities would build public schools.  State governments 
had not yet assumed a primary role in the provision of public education, but they had a 
real presence, a fact which is all too often ignored in the literature on education finance.  
It is now at this point, around the start of the 20th Century, that data on education finance 
become available, and the next chapter will continue the story of education finance in the 
United States through the analysis of this data. 
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Chapter 5 
The State Share of Education Revenue 
 Chapter 4 recounted the early history of education finance in the United States.  
At the end of the 20th Century the federal government began collecting data on education 
finance, and this chapter will explore that data in order to complete the rest of the 
historical record.  After considering long-term national trends in education finance, the 
focus will then turn to what has happened since the 1971 Serrano decision, and, more 
specifically, to how the state government share of education funding has changed over 
time. 
 
Education Finance During the 20th Century 
Beginning in 1890, data on United States education finance become available 
courtesy of the United States Office of Education in the Department of the Interior (Mort 
1933).  Documentation on the data sources on education revenues which generated the 
figures below is in Appendix A: Data Sources.  Missing years of data were interpolated.  
While it would perhaps be preferable to have data on expenditures, revenues and 
expenditures for education are so closely tied together that these data provide the same 
picture of the role of the state government in education finance. 
Because the scale of spending in education finance has changed so dramatically 
over the years being studied, it is helpful to look at the graphs of education spending over 
shorter time spans in order to see more detail.  Figure 5.1 displays the real revenues for 
public education, by source, from 1890 to 1945.  From 1890 to 1930 federal and state 
revenues are combined, but federal revenues were so small during this time that their 
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effect is negligible.  Figure 5.1 shows a steady increase in local revenues until about 
1920, with state revenues remaining fairly constant.  Because local revenues increased 
between 1890 and 1920 while state revenues did not keep pace, the state share of 
education revenues actually decreased from about 24 percent to about 17 percent during 
that time.  Between 1920 and 1930 there is then a large increase in both local and state 
revenues so that the level of education revenues increased dramatically while the shares 
from the two sources remained almost unchanged.  This increase in spending during the 
1920s coincides with the new importance of education after World War I and the 
investments made during the High School Movement, but again the state share of 
education revenues remained fairly constant at just below 17 percent.   
Figure 5.1 
Real Deflated Revenue By Source
(2000 Base Year)
1890-1945
-
5
10
15
20
25
30
18
90
18
94
18
98
19
02
19
06
19
10
19
14
19
18
19
22
19
26
19
30
19
34
19
38
19
42
B
ill
io
ns
Federal
Local
State
 
 
The next significant change occurred during the Great Depression.  Until this 
time, the local revenues that were paying for most of public education were derived 
primarily from property taxes.  Once the Great Depression hit the United States, property 
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values fell and defaults on property taxes increased, leading to a substantial decline in 
revenue.  Thus those who advocated more state involvement in education finance were 
able to achieve significant increases in the state’s share of revenues during the 1930s in 
order to alleviate the burden of local property taxes (Johns 1969).  During this time total 
education revenues did not change much, but the shares from state and local governments 
did.  In 1930 the state share of education revenue was just below 17 percent, but by 1940 
it had increased to over 30 percent.  By 1945 it had reached about 34 percent. 
Figure 5.2 displays real revenues for public education by source from 1945 to 
1970.  The pattern that emerges here is a steady increase in all sources of education 
revenue over these years.  The federal government’s role in education finance increased, 
but it still constituted a small share of total revenues.  Between 1945 and 1970 the state 
share of education revenue grew from about 34 percent to almost 40 percent.  Thus the 
overall change in the allocation of education revenues from state and local governments 
in the 25 years from 1945 to 1970 was an additional 6 percent, on top of the 13 percent 
change in the decade of the 1930s. 
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Figure 5.2 
Real Deflated Revenue By Source
(2000 Base Year)
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 Figure 5.3 shows real revenue for public education by source from 1970 to 2003.  
This graph highlights the data from the time period of court-ordered education finance 
reform, which began with the Serrano case in 1971.  If, as implied by the research on 
education finance reform, the state share of spending on education spending has 
increased as a result of these court cases, then Figure 5.3 should show a dramatic increase 
in the state share of revenues.  However, the pattern that emerges from the graph is that 
all revenue sources continued to increase while shares remained fairly constant.  In fact, 
in the 33 years from 1970 to 2003, the period in which 22 states became subject to court-
ordered equalization mandates, the state share of education revenues went from just 
under 40 percent to about 49 percent.  Figure 5.4 shows the actual share of education 
revenue by source from 1970 to 2003, and it reveals that most of the increase in state 
share happened during the 1970s, which was before most of the court cases had been 
decided.  By about 1980, the shares had reached a level that remained fairly constant, 
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except perhaps for another slight increase in the late 1990s. 
Figure 5.3 
Real Deflated Revenue By Source
(2000 Base Year)
1970-2003
-
100
200
300
400
500
19
70
19
73
19
76
19
79
19
82
19
85
19
88
19
91
19
94
19
97
20
00
20
03
B
ill
io
ns
Federal
Local
State
 
 
Figure 5.4 
Percent of Revenue by Source
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 Thus these data show that at the beginning of the 20th Century local governments 
certainly were primarily responsible for education finance.  Responsibility has gradually 
shifted, however, so that it is now almost equally shared by state and local governments.  
The most significant increase in the involvement of state governments came as a result of 
the Great Depression.  Since that time, all education revenues have increased 
dramatically, but the actual share of state governments has increased only gradually.  The 
next section explores what actually happened to the state share of education finance in 
those states which experienced court-ordered equalization reform.    
 
After Serrano 
Previous research on education finance reform typically suggests that court-
ordered equalization requires state governments to become much more involved in 
supporting public education.  For example, Murray et al. (1998) assert that “the 
distribution of revenues changed substantially over [the time period 1972–1992]” (798).  
They indicate that the state share of education spending, as opposed to the local district 
share, rose very quickly during the years of their study.  These assertions match with 
their findings that court-mandated reform improves equality in education expenditures 
within a state and also increases education expenditures.  The implication is that the state 
governments that have implemented education finance reforms have increased the share 
of the state contribution to education in order to make spending more equitable.   
Theobald and Picus (1991) also argue that each state with court-ordered reform 
has had “a substantial increase in the state’s role in funding public schools” (4).  In their 
study on the impact of reform on education funding, Manwaring and Sheffrin (1997) 
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note that, “One of the general tenets of the reform movement was to transfer more of the 
funding responsibility to the state level” (108).  Wood and Theobald (2003) consider 
how political leanings influence a state’s tendency to work toward education finance 
equality, and they also assert that with court-ordered reform there follows “a larger state 
allocation to local school districts” (723).  Fernández and Rogerson (1998) use a general 
equilibrium model to study the impact of moving from a locally financed education 
system to an entirely state-financed system, and again the authors state that with court-
ordered reform, the government works to “increase the role of the state and decrease that 
of local provision” (813).  Thus, while all of these authors are considering different 
aspects of education finance reform, they all base their arguments on the assumption that 
reform means the state government will play a larger role in financing public education. 
At this point it is useful to examine the revenue data for individual states during 
the recent period of court-ordered education finance reform.  Figure 5.5 shows graphs for 
several states of the percent of education revenues from the state government for each 
five-year panel from 1972 to 2002.  The solid lines represent the percent of revenue for 
the state government for the particular state, and the dotted lines represent the state 
government percentage of education revenue for the United States as a whole.  The first 
group includes all those states that experienced court-ordered education finance reform, 
with the year of reform indicated by a dark vertical line.  The second group includes a 
sample of those states that have experienced reform lawsuits where the court decided to 
uphold the current system of finance, with the years of those court cases again indicated 
by vertical lines.  The third group represents those states that have not experienced 
significant education reform litigation. 
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Figure 5.5 – State Government Percentage of Education Revenue: 
States with Court-Ordered Reform 
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New Jersey
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States with Funding System Upheld by Court 
Florida
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
1972 1977 1982 1987 1992 1997 2002
Pe
rc
en
ta
ge
          
Louisiana
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
1972 1977 1982 1987 1992 1997 2002
Pe
rc
en
ta
ge
 
Oregon
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
1972 1977 1982 1987 1992 1997 2002
Pe
rc
en
ta
ge
          
Pennsylvania
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
1972 1977 1982 1987 1992 1997 2002
Pe
rc
en
ta
ge
 
Virginia
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
1972 1977 1982 1987 1992 1997 2002
P
er
ce
nt
ag
e
          
Wisconsin
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
1972 1977 1982 1987 1992 1997 2002
Pe
rc
en
ta
ge
 
 
States with No Reform Litigation 
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 Based upon the data plotted in Figure 5.5, court-ordered finance reform does 
appear to increase the percent of education revenue provided by the state government, 
especially immediately after reform.  In many of these states, however, the state share of 
revenue appears to decrease slightly after the initial increase from reform.  The pattern is 
not as clear in those states that have had their education finance systems upheld or have 
not had reform at all; these states have a state share of revenue that goes up and down or 
even remains fairly constant over time. 
 In order to more vigorously test the hypothesis that court-ordered reforms lead to 
larger state shares, I employ regression analysis.  The initial model will be the same as 
the first ones used in Chapter 3 to test the impact of court-ordered reform on inequality 
and expenditures: 
Sit = Ditα + Xitβ + μi + ηt + εit 
where i stands for each state, t is for each panel year, Sit is the share of education revenue 
coming from the state government, Dit is the indicator variable Reform representing 
court-ordered reform, Xit is a vector of explanatory variables, μi is state fixed effects, ηt is 
year fixed effects, and εit is a random error term.  The indicator variable Reform takes on 
the value of 1 for each year after court-ordered reform occurs within a state, and 0 
otherwise. 
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 The data are again in panels of five-year intervals, from 1972 to 2002, with the 
same explanatory variables that were used in the regressions in Chapter 3, as listed 
below:   
• The Berry et al. measure of citizen ideology for each state and for each year.  My 
hypothesis is that more-liberal states will tend to have more centralized systems of 
public education and so will have a larger share of revenue from the state 
government.  
• Real per capita income (in thousands of dollars).  My hypothesis is that states 
with higher per capita income will generally have wealthier school districts that 
will not be as dependent upon the state government for revenue.  Therefore, states 
with higher per capita income will have a smaller share of revenue from the state 
government. 
• The percent of the state’s public school teachers covered under a collective 
bargaining agreement (teacher unionization).  I believe that large teachers’ unions 
will have a great deal of lobbying power and so will advocate for more support 
from the state government.  Therefore I expect that states with a larger percentage 
of the teachers covered under a collective bargaining agreement will have a larger 
state government share of education revenue. 
• An indicator variable for those states under preclearance from the United States 
Department of Justice before any changes can be made in voting regulations.  I 
believe that these states will have a higher state share of education revenue as they 
have increased minority representation who will have worked for increased 
education funding from the state government.   
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• The percent of the population that is school age (5 to 17).  Again, when a state has 
a relatively large percent of the population that is school age, it places an extra 
strain on the public education system, and it is likely that the school system will 
not be able to fully adjust to these changes.  Therefore it is expected that the 
percent of the population that is school age will have a negative effect on the state 
share of education revenue. 
• The percent of the population that is over age 65.  Having a relatively large 
proportion of the population that is over age 65 also places strains on a state’s 
finance system as this is a demographic that typically has large demands for social 
services.  It is my hypothesis that having a large percentage of the population that 
is over 65 will drive down the state share of education revenue. 
Results are sensitive to model specification, so there are two regressions shown in Table 
5.1 — one with state and year fixed effects, and one with year effects only.   
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Table 5.1 – Determinants of State Share of Education Revenue 
 
Variable State and Year Effects Year Effects 
Court-Ordered Reform    2.50 † (1.46) 
     6.37 ** 
(1.93) 
Ideology    -0.162 ** (0.060) 
-0.0032 
 (0.0609) 
Real Per Capita Income 
(thousands of dollars) 
0.408 
(0.421) 
   -2.59 ** 
(0.44) 
Teacher Unionization    7.55 * (3.04) 
2.39  
(3.01) 
Federal Supervision N/A -0.81  (2.50) 
Percent of Population 5 – 17    1.13 * (0.57) 
-1.10 
  (0.72) 
Percent of Population Over 65 -0.930   (0.785) 
    -2.10 ** 
 (0.53) 
Constant 33.1 (22.1) 
    153 ** 
(25) 
R2 0.828 0.254 
N 322 322 
** Significant at the 0.01 level 
* Significant at the 0.05 level 
† Significant at the 0.10 level 
 
In both regression models there is evidence that court-ordered reform increases 
the state share of education revenues.  In the regression with state and year fixed effects 
the coefficient indicates that a state with court-ordered reform has a state share of 
revenues that is about 2.5% higher than a state without reform.  The regression with year 
effects only indicates that a state with court-ordered reform has a state share of revenues 
that is about 6.4% higher.  In either case, these results indicate that court-ordered reform 
does increase the state share of education revenue, but not to the dramatic extent that is 
suggested in the literature.  In 2002 the average state share of education revenue for 
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states without court-ordered reform was 48.7%.  Compared to this already large 
percentage of education revenue coming from state governments, the best case of about 
6.4% is not such a large increase in revenue share after reform. 
The other explanatory variables also influence the share of revenue provided by 
the state government.  When state effects are included, the coefficient of ideology is 
negative and significant, a result which is somewhat unexpected as it goes against the 
hypothesis that more-liberal states have less of their education revenue coming from the 
state government.  The coefficient of income is negative and significant when state 
effects are excluded, as predicted.  As expected, the level of teacher unionization is 
positive and significant when state effects are included.  There is no significant effect for 
those states under federal supervision.  The coefficient of the percent of the population 
ages 5 to 17 is unexpectedly positive and significant when state effects are included.  
This result may be due to the legislature responding to a higher demand for public 
education when there is a large school-age population.  The coefficient of the percent of 
the population that is over age 65 is negative and significant when state effects are 
excluded, as was expected.  Thus on the whole, most of these results matched my 
hypotheses. 
Chapter 3 stressed the importance of treating court-ordered reform as an 
endogenous variable, and that is an important consideration here as well.  Table 5.2 
shows the two-stage regression on the state share of education revenue which treats 
Reform as an endogenous variable, just as in Chapter 3. 
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Table 5.2 – Two-Stage Regression on State Share of Education Revenue: 
Year Effects Only Model 
 
First Stage 
Variable Regression Coefficient 
Median Justice Ideology 0.00089 (0.00185) 
Partisan Judicial Selection -0.159   (0.111) 
Median Justice Ideology * 
 Partisan Selection 
     0.0061 ** 
(0.0022) 
Supermajority Requirement -0.118  (0.079) 
Ideology -0.0031  (0.0024) 
Real Per Capita Income 
(thousands of dollars) 
     0.0682 ** 
(0.0121) 
Teacher Unionization     -0.481 ** (0.085) 
Federal Supervision    -0.304 ** (0.072) 
Percent of Population 5 – 17    0.0478 * (0.0208) 
Percent of Population Over 65 0.0211 (0.0152) 
Constant     -1.86 ** (0.72) 
R2 0.293 
N 322 
** Significant at the 0.01 level 
* Significant at the 0.05 level 
† Significant at the 0.10 level 
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Second Stage 
Variable Regression Coefficient 
Court-Ordered Reform   20.1 * (8.0) 
Ideology -0.0018   (0.0657) 
Real Per Capita Income 
(thousands of dollars) 
    -3.50 ** 
(0.71) 
Teacher Unionization    9.36 † (5.15) 
Federal Supervision 3.55  (3.69) 
Percent of Population 5 – 17   -1.63 † (0.84) 
Percent of Population Over 65     -2.34 ** (0.58) 
Constant      176 **  (30) 
R2 0.132 
N 322 
** Significant at the 0.01 level 
* Significant at the 0.05 level 
† Significant at the 0.10 level 
 
 The results from this two-stage regression are somewhat troubling.  They indicate 
that those states which have had court-ordered education finance reform have a state 
share of education revenue that is 20% higher than states that have not had court-ordered 
reform.  Intuitively this coefficient seems much too large.  As stated above, in 2002 the 
average state share of education revenue for states without court-ordered reform was 
48.7%, and so if one of these states were to be ordered to reform, its state share would 
increase to about 68.7%, a number which is higher than the actual state share of revenue 
for any state in 2002 other than New Mexico.   
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Table 5.3 provides another way to consider the data.  For each panel in the data 
set, it shows the average state share of education revenue for those states that have had 
reform and those that have not, along with the difference in these values.  While looking 
at simple averages does not account for the other explanatory variables which affect the 
state share of education revenue, they do give some indication of the overall trends.  As 
Table 5.3 shows, there does not appear to be a large increase in the state share of 
education revenue once a state has had court-ordered reform.  Instead, there seems to be 
a long-term secular trend of an increase in state share for all states included in the 
sample. 
Table 5.3 – Average State Share of Education Revenue for States with and 
without Court-Ordered Reform 
 
Year Non-Reform Average 
Reform 
Average Difference 
1972 40.4 % N/A N/A 
1977 43.9 % 38.9 % -5.0 % 
1982 46.7 % 49.9 % 3.2 % 
1987 47.9 % 54.4 % 6.5 % 
1992 44.5 % 55.3 % 10.8 % 
1997 49.5 % 47.7 % -1.8 % 
2002 48.7 % 51.2 % 2.5 % 
 
 What is driving these unexpected results?  That is difficult to answer.  One point 
to recognize is that after court-ordered reform, some states do in fact have quite large 
increases in the share of education revenue from the state government.  Two states stand 
out in particular.  One is California, where it is generally acknowledged that after reform 
the legislature changed the state’s education finance system into one that is highly 
centralized, so that in 1972 (before reform had been implemented) the state share was 
about 35% and by 1982 it had reached almost 67%, a dramatic change of more than 30%.  
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The other state is New Hampshire.  For years New Hampshire had a noticeably small 
share of revenue from the state government.  In 1997, before reform, the state share of 
education revenue was only 7.4%, and in 2002, after reform, it had climbed to 51.8%, 
another dramatic change of 44.4%.  Acknowledging that these were two quite significant 
changes in the share of revenue coming from the state government, is it possible that 
these two states are behind the unexpected regression results in Table 5.2?  In order to 
test this hypothesis, Table 5.4 shows the same regression that was presented in Table 5.2, 
but with California and New Hampshire omitted. 
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Table 5.4 – Two-Stage Regression on State Share of Education Revenue, 
California and New Hampshire Omitted: 
Year Effects Only Model 
 
First Stage 
Variable Regression Coefficient 
Median Justice Ideology 0.0011 (0.0018) 
Partisan Judicial Selection   -0.211 † (0.122) 
Median Justice Ideology * 
 Partisan Selection 
   0.0059 * 
(0.0024) 
Supermajority Requirement -0.116   (0.077) 
Ideology -0.0023  (0.0024) 
Deflated Per Capita Income 
(thousands of dollars) 
     0.0662 ** 
(0.0120) 
Teacher Unionization     -0.557 ** (0.085) 
Federal Supervision    -0.294 ** (0.071) 
Percent of Population 5 – 17   0.0484 * (0.0205) 
Percent of Population Over 65   0.0277 † (0.0150) 
Constant     -1.91 ** (0.70) 
R2 0.280 
N 308 
** Significant at the 0.01 level 
* Significant at the 0.05 level 
† Significant at the 0.10 level 
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Second Stage 
Variable Regression Coefficient 
Reform  13.3   (9.5) 
Ideology -0.063  (0.058) 
Deflated Per Capita Income 
(thousands of dollars) 
    -2.90 ** 
0.72 
Teacher Unionization 6.18  (5.88) 
Federal Supervision 0.25  (3.77) 
Percent of Population 5 – 17   -1.55 † (0.81) 
Percent of Population Over 65     -2.23 ** (0.56) 
Constant     167 ** (29) 
R2 0.230 
N 308 
** Significant at the 0.01 level 
* Significant at the 0.05 level 
† Significant at the 0.10 level 
 
 In the second stage of the regression reported in Table 5.4, the coefficient of 
Reform is much smaller than the result from Table 5.2 (13.3% versus 20.1%), and it is 
now insignificant.  The other explanatory variables which were significant in Table 5.2 
have also dropped some in size and in the strength of their significance, but there is no 
change in sign.  The coefficient of the percent of teachers under a collective bargaining 
agreement is no longer significant, but it is still positive.  All of the other variables retain 
their significance.  Therefore while acknowledging that California and New Hampshire 
certainly did have large increases in the state share of education revenue after court-
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ordered reform, it is also possible to say that this is most likely the exception rather than 
the norm.  According to the regressions in Tables 5.2 and 5.4, any significant increase in 
the share of education revenue from the state after court-ordered reform is most typically 
on the order of about 10%, with some states having much larger changes. 
 
The Flypaper Effect 
To fully understand the impact of greater state share in response to court-ordered 
equalization, I next correlate the results of the state share equations with those of the per-
pupil expenditures equations.  In 2002 the average state share of education revenues in 
those states that had not had court-ordered reform was 48.7% and average expenditures 
were $6307.  Table 5.5 shows the shares and levels of funding from the state government 
as well as the combined figures for the local and federal governments.  It also shows how 
these figures change under the different results found in the various regression models 
used to determine the impact of Reform in this chapter, as well as Chapter 3. 
Table 5.5 – How Reform Impacts Per-Pupil Expenditures: 
Average State in 2002 
 
 Before Reform 
 Share Amount 
State 48.7% $3072 
Local & 
Federal 51.3% $3235 
Total 100% $6307 
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 After Reform, OLS Estimates  
with State and Year Effects 
2.5% State Share Increase, $221 Expenditure Increase 
 Share Amount Change 
State 51.2% $3342 $270 
Local & 
Federal 48.8% $3186 -$49 
Total 100% $6528 +$221 
   
$1 from the state 
leads to $0.82 
increase in 
expenditures 
 
 
 After Reform, OLS Estimates  
with Year Effects 
6.4% State Share Increase, $113 Expenditure Increase 
 Share Amount Change 
State 55.1% $3537 +$465 
Local & 
Federal 44.9% $2883 -$352 
Total 100% $6420 +$113 
   
$1 from the state 
leads to $0.24 
increase in 
expenditures 
 
 
 After Reform, Instrumental Variable Estimates 
13.3% State Share Increase, $80 Expenditure Increase 
 Share Amount Change 
State 62% $3960 $888 
Local & 
Federal 38% $2427 -$808 
Total 100% $6387 +$80 
   
$1 from the state 
leads to $0.09 
increase in 
expenditures 
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 What this table illustrates is that if total expenditures increase by $221 per-pupil, 
and state share increases by 2.5%, then the amount of funding from the state increases by 
$270, while the combined local and federal amount of funding decreases by $49.  On the 
whole, though, education spending is increased by about 82cents for each dollar added by 
the state government.  Alternatively, if the state share increases by 6.4%, with an increase 
in total expenditures of $113, then education spending increases by about 24 cents for 
each dollar added by the state government.  The final example is based upon a 13.3% 
increase in state share and a total increase in expenditures of $80, indicating that 
education spending increases about 9 cents for each dollar added by the state government. 
 While these estimates certainly differ, what is apparently happening in the states 
with reform is that local levels of revenue are decreasing in response to the increase in 
revenue from the state, as economic theory would predict, but not by an amount that is 
equal to the increase in revenue from the state.  This phenomenon is known in the public 
finance literature as the “flypaper effect” (Hines and Thaler, 1995).  When a state or local 
jurisdiction receives a lump-sum grant from higher level of government, economic theory 
says that the grant ought to be treated as an increase in income, and so public spending 
would be expected increase by anywhere from about 5 to 10 cents per dollar.  What is 
this data is indicating, however, is that spending probably increases by a much larger 
percentage, anywhere up to almost 82 cents.  Thus the money “sticks where it hits,” as 
Table 5.5 demonstrates. 
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Summary 
Chapter 4 showed that when public education began in the United States, it was 
universally considered to be the responsibility of local governments to support schools, 
perhaps with some small aid from state governments.  As this chapter has demonstrated, 
it was the Great Depression that served as the catalyst for state governments to bear a 
much larger burden of education costs.  From 1930 to 1945 alone, the state share of 
education revenues doubled from about 17 percent to 34 percent.  But from 1945 to 
2003, the state share of education increased from 34 percent to about 49 percent, a 
change of only 15 percent.  Thus since World War II there has been an increasing role 
for states in supporting public education, but it has been a gradual change.  Looking at 
the time of education finance reform from 1970 to the present also does not reveal a 
significant change like the one seen during the Great Depression.  Instead we see the 
same gradual increase in the state share of education revenues that has been taking place 
since 1945.  Regression analysis shows that the increase in state share due to court-
ordered reform has in fact been small – somewhere between 2.5% to 13.3% when states 
are already providing over 48% of the funds for public education.  These do represent 
increases in the state role, although almost certainly they are not as large as reformers 
would have hoped.  Using the effects estimated through the above regression analysis 
shows that these gains represent a return of up to 82 cents on the dollar for the additional 
money being provided by the state. 
With such heavy involvement by state governments before education reforms 
even began to take place, it could hardly be expected that with reform they would be able 
to allocate much additional funding to the public schools.  In fact, when states began to 
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increase their share of education revenues during the Great Depression, it was to alleviate 
the difficulty of paying local property taxes.  Thus state governments had already 
assumed the role of trying to ease the burden of costly local taxes and would be hard-
pressed to suddenly take on more of this responsibility.  What they are able to do, though, 
is to reallocate their share of education finance in order to make expenditures within a 
state more equitable.  State governments have continued to gradually increase their share 
of the public education burden, but at the steady rate that has been seen since World War 
II rather than through sudden changes. 
In sum, the findings to this point have shown that after court-ordered reform, the 
level of inequality within a state decreases, there is perhaps some increase in per-pupil 
expenditures, and the state share of education revenue does increase.  Given the effects 
estimated through regression analysis, the increase in education revenue from state 
governments is then offset to some degree by a decrease in local and federal revenues.7  
However, the return to the increase from the state governments is somewhere on the 
order of 9 to 82 cents on the dollar, which still leads to an overall increase in education 
expenditures.  The next chapter provides further insight into how these changes take 
place by providing a case study of court-ordered reform in Texas. 
 
                                                 
7 Most likely this is almost entirely due to a decrease in local revenues because the federal government 
seems to have been unaffected by these reforms occurring in state education finance systems. 
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Chapter 6 
Texas and Taxes 
“School finance in Texas is beginning to resemble a 19th century Russian novel.   
The story line runs across generations, the plot is complex, the prose is tedious,  
and everybody dies in the end.” (Hobby and Yudof 1991) 
 The state of Texas has a long and complicated history of school finance reform.  It 
involves many years of lawsuits, court rulings, and attempts by the legislature to 
implement changes to the system of education finance.  This chapter provides a case 
study of what has happened in Texas education finance reform in order to provide further 
evidence as to why large policy changes may not be forthcoming after court-ordered 
reform.  Texas has a large public education system with over 1,000 school districts, and it 
currently serves over four million students.  Any changes to this vast system are complex 
and full of politics.  In what follows I begin with a history of how events have unfolded 
in the state and then turn to look at more recent developments. 
 
The History of Education Finance Reform in Texas 
 The Texas story begins with the creation of the state’s public education system.8  
The 1875 state constitution says that, “A general diffusion of knowledge being essential 
to the preservation of the liberties and rights of the people, it shall be the duty of the 
Legislature of the State to establish and make suitable provision for the support and 
maintenance of an efficient system of public free schools” (Texas Constitution, Article 
                                                 
8 Unless otherwise noted, the information in this section is taken from Bosworth (2001) and Imazeki and 
Reschovsky (2004). 
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VII, § 1).  This clause was implemented by the Legislature in 1909 when it established 
school districts which were supported by local property taxes.  Over time additional 
funding came from the state government in the form of specific aid for textbooks or 
transportation. 
 As in most other states, the Great Depression and World War II left local districts 
in great need of revenue.  And again as in other states, it was at this point that the state 
government stepped in to accept a greater responsibility for supporting public education.  
The Texas legislature responded by adopting a foundation plan to guarantee a certain 
level of per-pupil spending for each school district.  As discussed by Coons et al. (1970), 
the difficulty with a foundation plan is that it does not directly lead to more equality 
within an education finance system, as each district receives a specific amount of funding 
per student, regardless of need.  Another problem that plagued the Texas system was that 
the foundation plan which the legislature adopted did not keep up with the changes in 
education costs or the increasing enrollments that occur over time.  Thus the inequalities 
inherent in a system of local education finance were far from alleviated by the state 
government’s foundation plan. 
 These circumstances set the stage for a lawsuit against the Texas system of public 
education.  In 1968 Demetrio Rodriguez filed a lawsuit against his children’s school 
district, San Antonio Independent School District.  The suit claimed that the school 
finance system was a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, as its dependence upon local property taxes meant that it discriminated on 
the basis of the wealth of the school district.  After working its way through the federal 
court system, in 1973 the United States Supreme Court, in a 5-4 decision, ruled that 
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education is not a fundamental right guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution, and therefore 
inequalities in the system are not a violation of the equal protection clause.  The Court 
also found that local control of education is a compelling reason for the state to establish 
an education finance system like the one in Texas.  Thus after the Rodriguez case, 
plaintiffs who wished to see change in their state’s education finance system were forced 
to appeal to state, and not federal, courts. 
 The Rodriguez case was enough to give the Texas Legislature a scare.  In the 
years immediately following the ruling, the legislature increased the minimum foundation 
level and also offered additional aid to the poorest school districts.  But once again these 
changes did not significantly equalize spending across Texas school districts.  Texas also 
experienced economic difficulties in the early 1980s because of a large drop in the price 
of oil.  This recession reduced state revenues, which in turn meant cutbacks in state 
education spending.   
It was at this point that poor school districts decided to take action.  In 1984, the 
Mexican American Legal Defense and Education Fund (MALDEF) filed suit against the 
state Commission of Education in Texas district court.  The plaintiffs claimed that the 
education system violated the equal protection clause of the Texas constitution, as the 
disparities in spending were based upon wealth and race.  They also claimed that the 
system violated the education clause’s requirement for an “efficient” system of schools.   
The Edgewood Independent School District et al. v. Kirby case was briefly put on 
hold as the legislature responded to the recommendations of a special commission on 
education reform.  But the bill enacted by the legislature once again did not change the 
basic foundation plan, but simply added some more money to the system.  The plaintiffs 
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went ahead with the lawsuit.  After working its way through lower courts, in 1989 the 
Texas Supreme Court ruled, in a 9-0 decision, that the state’s education finance system 
was unconstitutional.  Their findings were based upon the fact that poor school districts 
could tax themselves at a very high rate and still not obtain the amount of revenue that 
wealthy school districts could raise from much lower tax rates, which was a violation of 
the “efficiency” requirement.  In fact, at the time of the Edgewood decision, there was a 
700:1 ratio between the per-pupil property wealth of the state’s wealthiest school district 
and the poorest school district.  The court thus ordered the Legislature to find a remedy 
for the system and improve the relationship between a district’s level of tax effort and the 
financial resources which were available to it. 
Special sessions of the Legislature were called in 1990 to make the needed 
education finance reforms.  Because the court had not been specific about what sort of a 
plan would be acceptable, the legislators were uncertain as to just how far they should go 
in the changes they were making to the system.  It took many months of wrangling 
between the Legislature, the governor, and even the district court to achieve some sort of 
a solution.  Ultimately they decided to cause as little disturbance to the system as 
possible, and the law they passed increased support for education through increases in the 
sales tax and sin taxes.  The poor districts were still unhappy with this remedy because 
they did not believe the state would stick to this promise of more money, and so the case 
was brought back to the courts. 
In the 1991 Edgewood II case, in another 9-0 decision, the Texas Supreme Court 
ruled that the system itself needed to be reformed, and that funding increases were not a 
true fix of the fundamental problems.  The Legislature had to go back to the drawing 
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board, and this time they took a different approach.  The new plan created by the 
Legislature took the state’s more than 1,000 school districts and consolidated them into 
almost 200 superdistricts, known as county education districts (or CEDs), for tax 
purposes only.  Taxes would be levied and distributed on an equal per-pupil basis within 
each of these districts.  It was during this period that the term “Robin Hood” began to be 
used to describe the new Texas education finance plan to describe how money was being 
redistributed from wealthy school districts to the poorer districts.   
This time it was the wealthy school districts who took the state to court because 
the state was taking their money.  In 1992 the State Supreme Court ruled in Edgewood III 
that the latest school finance system was also unconstitutional.  In this case the fault lay 
in the fact that the system was, in effect, a statewide property tax which, is not allowed 
under the Texas constitution.  Another problem was that there had been no voter approval 
of these local school property taxes, which is required by the state constitution.  The 
Legislature would have to try yet again. 
At first the Legislature tried to put the CED plan to the voters.  If the people of 
Texas approved the plan through a ballot proposition, the Court could no longer object.  
Unfortunately for the Legislature, the people of Texas turned down the plan by a 63-37% 
vote.  So the Legislature once again created a new plan, and this time their hope was that 
fiscal neutrality would be achieved; that is, that revenue would not be correlated with 
district wealth.  There were three main parts to the new plan.  Tier I was a foundation 
formula that guaranteed each school district a certain amount of money per-pupil as long 
as they levied property taxes at a specified minimum rate.  Tier II ensured school districts 
a certain amount of revenue for any higher property taxes that they levied upon 
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themselves.  The most controversial piece was the third part, which was the recapture 
provision that capped school district property wealth.  Any school district that had per-
pupil property wealth above $280,000 had to select from one of five options the state 
provided to redistribute that wealth to other school districts.  When this three-part system 
went before the Texas Supreme Court in 1995, they ruled in Edgewood IV that it was 
constitutional.  The court warned, however, that it was concerned about the lack of 
equality in funding when it came to capital facilities.  The legislature responded to this 
note of caution by increasing funding for facilities and debt financing.   
How far did these changes go toward improving equality in the Texas education 
finance system?  Table 6.1 shows the Gini coefficient for Texas in each of the panels of 
data from 1972 to 2002. 
Table 6.1 – Texas Gini Coefficient 
 
Year 
Average 
Gini 
Coefficient 
1972 0.0786 
1977 0.0928 
1982 0.1003 
1987 0.0784 
1992 0.0658 
1997 0.0491 
2002 0.0534 
 
Inequality increased in Texas through the 1970s and into the early 1980s, reaching a high 
in 1982.  The situation improved some by 1987, but it is after the initial Edgewood ruling 
in 1989 that a dramatic drop in inequality can be seen.  By the late 1990s and into 2002, 
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the Gini coefficient had dropped to a level of about 0.05.  In fact, in 1972 Texas was the 
25th most equitable state of the 46 states in my sample, and by 2002, had climbed to the 
13th most equitable state.  Thus real improvements were made within the system during 
this time.  But what about all of the wrangling among the branches of government that it 
took to get to this place?   Was everyone finally happy with the education finance system 
that had been established?  And in particular, were the wealthy districts happy with this 
“Robin Hood plan”?  As the next section explains, the answer is that Texas still had not 
reached an equilibrium in its education finance system, and so the search for a politically 
acceptable education finance system continued. 
 
The Recent Battles over Education Finance in Texas 
 As indicated above, residents of wealthy school districts in Texas were unhappy 
with the system of education finance that had eventually been determined to be 
constitutional by the state Supreme Court.  What particularly rankled them was the 
recapture provision.  
 This continuing controversy led to one of the most unusual events in education 
finance reform.  In 2001, wealthy school districts came together to file a new case against 
the state, West Orange-Cove v. Alanis, and once again the claim was that the education 
finance system was unconstitutional.  Their argument was based upon the property tax 
cap in the finance system.  In order to participate in Tier I of the system, or the 
foundation plan, a school district must levy property taxes of $0.86 per $100 of property 
wealth.  Each penny of taxes that a school district levied above $0.86 falls under Tier II, 
and the state guarantees a certain amount of revenue for that additional effort.  The 
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problem is that the state prohibits any taxes above $1.50 per $100 of property value.   The 
plaintiffs argued that this amounts to a state property tax, which is prohibited under the 
Texas constitution.  So many school districts in Texas had reached this cap that they 
claimed any “meaningful discretion” in deciding their tax rates had been lost.  The state 
Supreme Court remanded the case for trial, and in 2004, a trial court ruled that the system 
was still not adequately funded and that the $1.50 cap had become a state property tax 
(ACCESS 2005). 
 Thus the Legislature once again faced the prospect of implementing education 
finance reforms.  It proved to be quite a difficult task this time around.  At first the trial 
court set a deadline of October 1, 2005, for the Legislature to make the necessary changes 
in policy.  Thus when the Texas Legislature convened for its regular session in January 
2005, they believed that they were under pressure to reform the system.  However, the 
Legislature also knew that the case was under appeal to the Texas Supreme Court, which 
meant there was the possibility that the ruling would be overturned (Elliott 2005a).   
But the politics for this legislative session were complicated by another set of odd 
circumstances.  Many legislators did want education finance reform, and Governor Rick 
Perry supported this idea.  The Robin Hood system of recapturing revenue from the 
wealthiest districts was unpopular among Republicans representing suburban districts, 
and many wanted to replace local revenue with state revenue in order to reform this 
system.  The catch was that many leaders were also committed to lowering property taxes 
(Elliott 2005b).  These opposing goals meant that the state would have to find revenue 
through alternative forms of taxation, but in a state that prohibits an income tax or 
statewide property tax, that proves to be a challenge.   
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At first the Senate proposed a statewide property tax plan that would require 
approval by Texas voters, but this plan was set aside in order to be able to implement 
other state taxes so that property tax cuts could be achieved (Robison 2005a).  Eventually 
legislators adjourned the regular session without having passed any changes to the school 
finance or tax systems.  A major problem was that the Senate and House were unable to 
agree upon how to split the state tax burden between businesses and consumers (through 
an increase in the sales tax), and this debate resulted in unresolved gridlock (Robison and 
Ratcliffe 2005).  In the end, analysts believed that House Speaker Tom Craddick wanted 
to wait to hear how the Texas Supreme Court would rule before deciding upon a plan, 
and without the agreement of the Speaker of the House, the Legislature was stuck and 
unable to pass any reforms (Robison 2005b). 
On June 21, the Legislature reconvened in a special session called by the 
governor.  Once again most legislators wanted to lower property taxes, and the question 
was what combination of other state taxes should be used to replace the lost revenue 
(Associated Press 2005).  As the session started, the differences of opinion between 
Governor Rick Perry, Lieutenant Governor David Dewhurst, and House Speaker Tom 
Craddick were once again evident.  They disagreed over business and sales taxes, the two 
primary ways for the state to raise revenue (Elliott and Robison 2005a).  Adding to the 
mix were legislators who felt like they were being forced to stay in Austin for a hopeless 
cause, or at least a cause that was primarily about the governor starting his reelection 
campaign on a platform of lower property taxes (Ratcliffe 2005a).  Once again the debate 
between the two houses turned into the House wanting higher consumer taxes and the 
Senate opposing such measures.  The Senate hoped to increase business taxes by closing 
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loopholes in the already existent franchise tax and also broadening the business tax base 
by taxing previously excluded partnerships (Elliott and Ratcliffe 2005a).  Democrats 
provided additional opposition as they wanted increases in school funding and not just 
revenue to replace cuts in property taxes.  Not to be left out, the oil and gas industry also 
opposed closing loopholes in the business tax.  In a state that is so dependent upon these 
industries, the oil and gas lobby have a great deal of influence, and many legislators 
listened (Robison and Elliott 2005a).  As all of these negotiations were taking place in the 
Legislature, the Texas Supreme Court was also listening to an appeal of the district 
court’s decision in the West Orange Cove case, and everyone anticipated it would be 
weeks before there would be a ruling (Ratcliffe and Elliott 2005). 
As the first special session of the summer of 2005 came to a close, it became clear 
that no compromise would be reached.  The House and the Senate both supported 
reducing the unpopular recapture provision, but they still disagreed over how to raise that 
money through additional state taxes while reducing property taxes (Elliott and Robison 
2005b).  Once the first session was over, Governor Perry immediately called a second 
special session to continue to try to negotiate reforms to the education finance system 
(Elliott and Robison 2005c).  Their efforts quickly went downhill as the House 
overwhelmingly voted against its own tax and education funding bills.  Because any tax 
bill must originate in the House under Texas law, unless the House was willing to act on 
another bill, no progress could be made during the session (Robison and Mack 2005).  
Eventually House Speaker Craddick called for the Legislature to just end the special 
session and wait to hear the ruling on the education finance system from the Texas 
Supreme Court (Robison and Elliott 2005b).  For a short time it looked like two similar 
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tax and education bills might be revived in the House (Elliott 2005c), but ultimately the 
effort was to no avail as yet another session ended with no reform (Ratcliffe 2005b).  For 
the time being, Governor Perry declined to call another special session (Elliott and 
Ratcliffe 2005b). 
Heading into the fall of 2005, the Legislature and Governor were waiting to hear 
from the Texas Supreme Court.  During this apparent intermission, hurricanes Katrina 
and Rita struck the Gulf Coast, causing serious damage to the Texas economy.  In 
addition, many Texas schools enrolled evacuees from Louisiana, which meant a large 
unexpected cost for those school districts.  While the federal government promised to 
reimburse Texas for these students, the added strain on the education finance system once 
again highlighted the problems that still had not been fixed by the Legislature (Elliott 
2005d).  At this time Governor Perry also appointed a commission to make 
recommendations on a new tax plan for the state, with the hope that it would have an 
impact on how the Legislature would reform the education finance system (Robison  
2005d). 
Then, on Tuesday, November 22, the Texas Supreme Court finally issued its 
ruling.  The Court disagreed with the trial court’s ruling in that it found that the state was 
meeting its obligation of providing an adequate education.  It did warn, however, that in 
the future the state may fail to satisfy this requirement, as various measures of student 
achievement in the state were revealing increasing deficiencies.  But the Court did agree 
with the trial court that the tax system had in essence become a statewide property tax.  
67% of the districts in the state were at or close to the cap of $1.50 per $100 in valuation, 
meaning that there was no real local discretion.  Thus the Legislature did not have to 
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increase funding for education, but it did have to reform the funding system, and the 
court set a deadline of June 1, 2006 (Elliott and Robison 2005d). 
 Because the legislators were facing party primaries in March of 2006, Governor 
Perry decided to wait until after those elections to call the next special session (Elliott and 
Ratcliffe 2005c).  The rhetoric on education finance reform still continued through the 
campaigns (Associated Press 2006), and Governor Perry called the special session to 
begin on April 17, with the June 1 deadline looming (Ratcliffe and Robison 2006).  
Shortly before the session started, Governor Perry’s special tax commission 
recommended that the Legislature cut property taxes and replace them with a new broad-
based business tax and an increased tax on cigarettes.  The response from politicians was 
mixed, indicating that this session would see a replay of many of the same debates from 
previous sessions (Robison 2006). 
 The special session began on April 17, and from the beginning the differences of 
opinion were clear.  One of the first pieces of legislation considered by the House was a 
plan that was very different from the one supported by Governor Perry.  This alternate 
plan would make use of the state’s budget surplus to cut property taxes, but the concern 
was that this plan would not be sustainable in the long-run (Elliott and Robison 2006).  
Many different plans were considered by the House, and these included a cigarette tax 
increase, as well as smaller items such as a requirement that used car buyers pay sales tax 
based upon the car’s blue book value.  Some also raised the question of whether a 
proposed tax on partnerships would fall under the forbidden category of an income tax.   
 On May 2, the Senate approved a House bill that changed the state’s business tax, 
marking a watershed agreement.  The Senate also agreed to bills that replaced property 
 
 121
taxes with the revenue from the new business tax, as well as the tax that requires used 
cars be taxed at their blue book value (Elliott 2006a, and Elliott and Ratcliffe 2006).  At 
long last, the two houses of the Texas Legislature agreed upon five bills to restructure the 
system: 
• House Bill 1 - The state budget surplus would be used to lower property taxes and 
support a teacher pay raise. 
• House Bill 2 - Most of the new revenue from the revamped business tax would go 
toward lowering property taxes. 
• House Bill 3 – The new business tax was enacted. 
• House Bill 4 – The sales tax on used cars must be paid on the blue book value. 
• House Bill 5 – The cigarette tax was increased (Elliott 2006b). 
It appeared that Texas had an answer to the funding crisis, but many in the state were left 
with questions.  Was it really over?  Businesses were unhappy with their new taxes, and 
property owners were concerned that their taxes would soon increase.  Could the 
politicians ignore these complaints from their constituents?  And then there were the 
courts to consider.  The Texas Supreme Court had indicated that the state was 
dangerously close to an unconstitutional system in that the education that many children 
were receiving was almost inadequate.  And yet, the Legislature had not attempted to 
significantly increase spending on education, but rather had been concerned about finding 
new state taxes to simply replace property taxes.  In order to better understand what had 
happened in Texas, I decided to speak with some of the people who had been involved in 
this process. 
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Interviews with Texas Legislators and Staff Members 
 I contacted Senate committee staff members9, House Representatives, and a 
Senator who had been involved in the recent education finance battles in Texas and 
requested interviews with them that would take place during July 2006.  They generally 
requested that their names not be used, and so their names will not be included here.  I 
had many questions for this group, but mainly I wanted to understand what was the root 
of the difficulty that Texas has had in deciding how to reform its education finance 
system?  Why would this battle not go away?  Is there something in the structure of the 
Legislature that made the problem more difficult?  Were constituents really so concerned 
about education finance or taxes that their preferences were creating problems? 
 The first Senate committee staff member with whom I spoke pointed to the great 
diversity of school districts in Texas as a major problem.  I had wondered why the 
Republicans, who are a majority in both houses of the Texas Legislature and hold the 
governor’s seat, could not push through a bill on party support alone.  What this staff 
member said is that education finance reform is an issue that does not fall along party 
lines.  Rather, education finance in Texas tends to be an issue that breaks down along the 
lines of rural Republicans and urban Democrats versus suburban Republicans.  I also 
questioned her about what alternatives had been considered.  For example, does anyone 
ever dare to suggest that the idea of an income tax be placed on the table?  The answer 
was that an income tax has never been seriously considered.  The staff member noted that 
the taxing options for the Legislature were quite limited, and that this lack of options did 
                                                 
9 Because the Texas Senate is controlled by Republicans, these committee staff members work for 
Republican Senators. 
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not help in solving the problem.  She also noted that discussing the consolidation of 
school districts is an unpopular idea that is rarely discussed.  As to why reform finally did 
happen, she noted that the June 1 deadline was a strong incentive to make changes, and 
that in previous sessions the Legislature had been hesitant to act as it wanted to see how 
the Texas Supreme Court would rule. 
 Another Senate committee staff member echoed the sentiment that a court 
mandate was necessary for reform to happen.  He also mentioned the diversity of the over 
1,000 school districts in Texas and how difficult it was to negotiate a plan that would be 
appropriate for all of them, especially as the issue did not fall along 
Republican/Democratic lines.  One interesting point he made was that the Republicans 
were relatively new to legislative leadership in Texas, as the state had been controlled by 
Democrats for such a long time, and so they were still learning the art of leadership.  This 
staff member discussed how a great deal of the debate amounted to semantics.  If the 
government is collecting a tax from you, how much does the average person care whether 
it is the state or local government that is taking their money?   
When asked about what options were considered, he told me that they do not 
spend time on items like an income tax because they wanted to focus on what could 
actually pass the Legislature.  An important note from this interview was that it is 
essential to understand how spending on education has evolved over time.  Education 
spending has increased without a corresponding increase in student performance because 
of all the additional demands on public education, such as providing food and healthcare 
for students, and these services were not traditionally part of the system’s mission.  As 
public schools continue to play more of a social service role, the cost of education will 
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continue to increase.  This staff member ended the discussion by explaining one of the 
paradoxes of education finance.  The people of Texas were frustrated with the school 
system and these battles, but they almost always view their own schools and school 
districts favorably, which limits how much reform they will support. 
I began my interviews with legislators by speaking with a Republican Senator 
from a suburban district.  He started by explaining that the problem under the Robin 
Hood education finance system had been a decreasing state share of education revenue, 
and that the recently passed legislation was designed to increase the state share.  His hope 
is that the state share will reach about 65%, at which point he believes equality will no 
longer be a major issue.   
When asked why it has been so difficult to find an answer to education finance in 
Texas, the Senator had several answers.  First he thinks that the education community 
always wants more money, no matter how much the state gives, and so you will always 
have the education lobby asking for more.  He also discussed the diversity of school 
districts in Texas and the difficulties in particular with urban districts.  In rural areas, the 
school district is often the largest employer with some of the best jobs (particularly 
because of good benefits).  Thus while consolidation of these small districts might lead to 
savings on spending, the resulting job loss would be unpopular.  A side note which 
cannot be ignored in Texas is that consolidation would alter football teams, and that such 
changes are another political minefield.  The third concern that the Senator expressed was 
the rising cost of social services.  As demands for these services are increasing at 12 to 
18% a year, traditional state spending in areas such as education is likely to be “squeezed 
out.”  He also believes that honest discussions about these difficulties are not taking place 
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so that solutions for them can be found.  Like others, he did not believe that discussion of 
an income tax was likely to go anywhere. 
The Senator concluded by expressing how much is expected of public schools 
today and how it is difficult to meet all of those demands.  Much like the Senate 
committee staff member, he stated how the schools must feed children, provide 
healthcare for them, and also support extracurricular activities.  The expectations for 
students continue to rise, and so all of these requirements are costly, and it will take time 
for the system to adapt to these requirements. 
My next interview was with a Republican Representative to the House, also from 
a suburban district.  He began by stating that he believes Texas is a conservative state that 
generally does not want to spend as much as others on education.  The Representative 
believes that a more centralized source of revenue would solve the problem of voter 
dissatisfaction with property taxes but that an income tax would not be approved.  The 
Representative supports a sales tax but realizes that Democrats in the state would not be 
supportive of such a measure. He would particularly like to see education funding follow 
the child and for education matters to be primarily under local control.  As in my other 
interviews, he stated that education finance is not a partisan issue, but rather a rural/urban 
versus suburban issue and a poor versus rich issue.   
My final interview was with a Democratic Representative from an urban district, 
and he presented a very different perspective on the issues in Texas education finance 
reform.  From his point of view, the majority of the legislators do not believe that there is 
an issue of adequacy in the education finance system, and so their only priority was to 
decrease property taxes.  One of the main reasons for all of the wrangling in the multiple 
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legislative sessions was that House Speaker Craddick had a specific plan that he wanted, 
and he was reluctant to compromise.  Ultimately he believes that the Legislature does not 
want to do any more than the courts order them to do, and when the Texas Supreme 
Court is reluctant to spell out specific requirements, you witness many rounds of rulings 
and partial, half-hearted reform.  When asked about the possibility of a state income tax, 
the word the Representative used to describe the reactions when it had been briefly 
proposed was “thud.” 
The Representative had a different take on the situation when I asked him about 
the division among school districts in Texas.  He disagreed that the divide is rural/urban 
versus suburban.  Instead, he said that the leadership is able to keep rural Republicans in 
line with their agenda by threatening consolidation of their school districts.  Beyond 
economic concerns, he stated that school district consolidation in Texas is controversial 
because it would mean desegregation and it would affect football.  Another key point is 
that he believes the issue will soon be back as the Legislature did not address adequacy of 
education in poorer districts. 
There were some common themes, as well as some disagreement, in these 
interviews, and so the next section provides an analysis of the difficulty of education 
finance reform in Texas. 
 
Analysis 
 Why has it been so difficult to reform education finance in the state of Texas?  
Why have there been so many rounds between the Legislature and the courts?  The 
events and interviews described above provide several insights. 
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 The primary problem appears to be that this is a state in which a large majority of 
citizens are not clamoring for reform.  The Court has ordered reform many times, and the 
most common response of the Legislature has been to make minimal changes and then 
wait to see how the courts respond.  Their initial response to the Edgewood decision was 
to cause as little disturbance as possible.  In the summer of 2005 the Governor called 
special sessions to work on the problem, but rather than find solutions, the Legislature 
decided to wait and see what the Texas Supreme Court would do next.  Once the Court 
issued its ruling in the fall of 2005, it all but stated that the education finance system in 
Texas was inadequate, and yet the Legislature chose to ignore the issue of adequacy in its 
reforms.  The Republican Representative I spoke with said that Texas is a conservative 
state that does not like to spend a great deal on education, and the Democratic 
Representative also said that the Legislature does not view adequacy as an issue.  Given 
this evidence, one conclusion is that the Legislature does not view reform as necessary or 
even desirable.  Thus even when the court does issue a ruling demanding reform, it is to 
be expected that the legislators will not make any substantial changes to the education 
finance system. 
 Another complicating matter is the Court’s reluctance to explicitly state the 
remedies it expects to be implemented.  State courts in the United States have historically 
been reluctant to intervene in what they view as legislative matters, and when they do 
intercede, they are also hesitant to outline specific solutions (Lopeman 1999).  The same 
has been true of education finance reform in Texas; the Court rules that the current 
system is unconstitutional, but it does not state what reforms would be permissible.  This 
leaves the Legislature uncertain as to just what changes must be made, and as stated 
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above, this results in the Legislature making as few reforms as it deems necessary.  At 
times the Legislature has even asked for clarification without receiving a definite answer 
from the Court.  As Gerber et al. (2000) discuss, when true reform is desired, the more 
specific the guidelines a legislature is given, the more constrained they are to implement 
the intended changes.  In California, for instance, once the state court specified that per-
pupil expenditures had to be within a certain range, the Legislature was forced to make 
very specific reforms to improve equality.  As the Texas Supreme Court continues to say 
what is unconstitutional without specifying what plans would be allowable, it is likely 
that these rounds of rulings and reforms will continue indefinitely. 
 There is another classic public policy problem at work here as well.  Everyone 
supports more spending on education, and yet no one wants to pay more taxes (Sears and 
Citrin 1982).  For example, in an August-September 2005 poll of Texans, 45% of 
respondents were in favor of a state income tax while 47% were against, and 65% of 
respondents believed that their property taxes were too high (Robison 2005c).  As the 
former chairman of the Senate Education committee, Bill Ratliff, noted in an interview, 
in order to increase the state share of education as would be needed to achieve equality, 
the Legislature must pass a significant tax bill, but so many representatives and senators 
are opposed to any tax increases that such a reform becomes impossible (Houston 
Chronicle  2005).  
 In summary, it has been a long road for Texas education finance reform, and this 
journey is likely to continue.  The Texas Supreme Court has warned the Legislature that 
it must provide an adequate education for the state’s students, and it is almost certainly 
only a matter of time before another lawsuit is filed requesting further changes based on 
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just such an argument.  But Texas is not a state that supports any significant reforms to its 
education finance system, and unless the courts are more specific in their requirements, it 
is unlikely that these cycles of ruling and reforms will disappear in the near future. 
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Chapter 7 
Conclusion 
Summary 
 Since the landmark Serrano v. Priest decision in California in 1971, education 
finance reform has been on the political agenda.  Lawsuits continue to be filed and 
appealed, legislatures continue to debate various methods of implementing reform, and 
scholars continue to seek to understand the implications of these changes to education 
finance systems. 
 Chapter 2 discussed the previous work on the effects of court-ordered education 
finance reform.  In this review of the literature it was apparent that most scholars believe 
that reform results in an improvement in the level of spending equality within a state, but 
there was a notable lack of agreement on the impact of reform on the level of education 
expenditures.  Of particular interest were the findings by Murray et al. (1998) and Hoxby 
(2001) which highlight the different theories in the literature.  Murray et al. claim the 
court-ordered reform brings attention to the education finance system and that 
legislatures respond by increasing state funding for public schools.  This is the theory that 
equalization reform results in leveling-up, or an increase in the overall level of 
expenditures.  Hoxby, on the other hand, asserts that reform leads to centralization of the 
education finance system, and that the incentives of increased centralization tend to 
promote a decrease in education expenditures, or leveling-down.  Because of the wide 
differences in the findings in the literature on education finance reform, it is necessary to 
employ careful analysis in order to determine the true impact of court-ordered reform. 
 Chapter 3 begins this analysis with a look at what the data reveal about trends in 
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education finance.  Graphs of the data appear to show that court-ordered reform does 
decrease the level of inequality within a state, but no similar pattern is apparent with per-
pupil expenditures.  I then employed linear regression analysis to replicate and extend the 
work of Murray et al.  I found that their results that reform decreases the level of 
inequality were robust to model specification, as well as the addition of two panels of 
data, although the effect decreased over time.    When it came to per-pupil expenditures, I 
found that the results were quite sensitive to the exclusion of state effects, as well as the 
addition of two panels of data, with the effect of reform becoming smaller in both cases.  
This result made me question their findings on the impact of court-ordered reform on 
education expenditures. 
 Another concern about previous work on education finance reform is that court 
orders have been treated as exogenous events.  However, I argue that these rulings are 
themselves a result of the education finance and political systems, and should therefore 
be considered endogenous events.  State courts are not immune to politics, and they also 
consider the current conditions of the education finance system in making their decisions.  
Another important consideration is that even when ordered to make reforms, state 
legislatures have a great deal of discretion in how they choose to implement these 
changes.  After considering several potential instrumental variables to predict court-
ordered reform, I determined that the appropriate instrumental variables were a measure 
of the ideology of the state court justices, the method of judicial selection (partisan versus 
nonpartisan), the interaction of these two variables, and a supermajority requirement for 
finding a law unconstitutional.  Once two-stage regression is employed using these 
instrumental variables, the effect of reform is still found to significantly decrease the 
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level of inequality within a state, but its impact on per-pupil expenditures is no longer 
significant. 
 In order to understand why large changes in the level of education expenditures 
should not have followed from court-ordered reform, in Chapter 4 I consider the history 
of education finance in the United States.  Much of the literature on education finance 
suggests that state governments have long had a minimal role in supporting public 
schools and that it has been the recent court rulings which have served as the catalyst for 
promoting a larger role for state governments.  A look at history tells a different story.  
Since the time of the Common School Movement of about 1820 to 1860, the state 
governments have played a role in education finance.  Initially their primary role was 
providing some financial aid in order to encourage communities to build public schools, 
but most education revenue did come from local sources.  At the time of the High School 
Movement at the beginning of the 20th Century, state governments continued in this role 
by giving money to communities as an incentive to build high schools.  Thus state 
governments have long had a place in public education, even if it was not always the 
large role that it is today. 
 Chapter 5 considered the state government share of education revenue since 1890.  
The data clearly show a large increase in the state share of education revenue during the 
Great Depression when local governments were having great difficulty raising revenue.  
By 1945 the state share of education revenue in the United States had reached 34%, and 
that number has only continued to climb.  Once the period of court-ordered education 
finance reform began in the 1970s, the steady increase in the state share persisted, but 
without a sudden increase or jump, as would be indicated by those who promote the idea 
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that state governments greatly increase their role in education finance after reform. 
 Linear regression analysis indicated that court-ordered reform increases the state 
share of education revenue by only about 2.5 to 6.4%.  Once reform is treated as an 
endogenous variable in a two-stage regression, this number jumps to 20%, but this 
finding is probably the result of a couple of outlier states that are driving the results.  It is 
most likely that court-ordered reform increases the state share by an order of about 10% 
in the majority of states, with a few states in particular having much larger increases as 
their education finance systems become quite centralized.  These results also lend 
themselves to an analysis of the flypaper effect in education finance.  That is, when the 
state government gives money for education to local governments, the funding from the 
local government decreases by an amount that is less than the amount of the transfer.  
This effect leads to an overall increase in expenditures that is smaller than the amount of 
additional funding from the state. 
 Chapter 6 provided a case study of education finance reform in Texas.  This is a 
state that has had many court rulings, as well as several attempts by the Legislature to 
find a constitutional education finance system.  A review of the history of events in 
Texas, as well as interviews with several legislators and staff members who have been 
involved in these debates, indicate that in general Texas is a state that does not want 
reform.  The conservative legislature and citizens have made minimal attempts at reform 
when pressed by the Court.  A complicating factor is that the Court is unwilling to spell 
out exactly what would be required in order to acheive a constitutional system.  Until 
either of these factors change, it is likely that Texas will continue to face lawsuits and 
half-hearted attempts at reform. 
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 What these chapters have shown is that court-ordered education finance reform 
does have an impact on a state’s education finance system.  The finding that the level of 
inequality in education spending decreases after reform is robust to model specification, 
as well as the addition of panels of data.  What has not been supported is that reform 
increases the level of expenditures.  Instead, regression analysis shows that per-pupil 
expenditures are not significantly affected by court-ordered reform.  In addition, the state 
share of education revenue does increase after reform, but in most states it is an increase 
on the order of only about 10%.  Because there is not a significant increase in 
expenditures, the amount of revenue coming from the local government must be 
decreasing in response to additional funding from the state government — although, as 
would be predicted by the flypaper effect, this exchange is not dollar for dollar. 
 I argue that large increases in state funding were not to be expected.  As Okun 
(1975) points out, in many areas of public policy, societies have a choice between 
policies that are redistributive and those that are efficient.  When a state moves to reform 
education finance in order to improve equality, it is therefore to be expected that new 
inefficiencies will be introduced into the system, thereby lowering education 
expenditures.  Also, as Rae et al. (1981) contend, the definition of equality is itself not an 
easy question to answer, and so in the process of reform, there are certain to be some in 
the political realm who are unhappy with the eventual outcome.  Even the definition of 
equality that is selected can impact the manner in which a legislature decides to 
implement reform, and this method will in turn have an impact on the level of education 
expenditures within the state.  Therefore the correlation between equality and 
expenditures will not always be straightforward. 
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 A second reason to doubt the efficacy of court-ordered reform for increasing 
education expenditures is that legislatures are known to be successful in finding their way 
around spending limits (Kiewiet and Szakaly 1996), restrictions imposed by ballot 
initiatives (Gerber et al. 2000), and even court decisions (Rosenberg 1991).  State 
governments had long been involved in education finance, and there are many other 
demands on their limited resources; when ordered to reform it is to be anticipated that 
they will be unable to greatly increase their support for education spending and that in 
many cases they will find ways to change the education finance system with as little 
disruption as possible.  Furthermore, as Rosenberg explains, court cases such as these 
education finance reform cases, are generally a way of reinforcing a public policy 
movement that is already under way rather than a catalyst to begin such change.  As 
shown in Chapter 5, the state share of education revenue has been steadily increasing 
since the Great Depression.  While these court cases have supported those continuing 
increases, it would not be correct to say that they began this trend in education finance.  
Thus this study supports the theory that education finance court cases have reinforced 
changes in these systems, but they have not led to the dramatic increases in spending for 
which many reformers had hoped. 
 
Future Research 
 This analysis has answered several questions about the impact of court-ordered 
education finance reform, but there are also many avenues for future research.  Even 
though it has been shown to be the case that these reforms improve equality without 
impacting the level of education expenditures, reformers in many states continue to file 
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lawsuits and work for education finance reform.  Assuming these actors are rational, they 
must have the expectation that they will receive some benefit from these costly actions.  
Is it the case that the poor school districts which bring reform lawsuits are simply hoping 
for more money for their districts and not necessarily for the entire system?  That is, are 
the poor districts receiving enough benefits from the redistribution of education funding 
that it is worthwhile for them to continue to pursue these lawsuits?  Studying the changes 
in the distribution of education funding after reform would be one way to better 
understand the implications of reform and why reformers continue to pursue these court 
cases. 
 Of course as these reforms continue to take place, additional data will add to the 
understanding of changes in education finance.  Once the 2007 Census of Governments is 
released by the United States Census Bureau, a new panel of data can be included in the 
analysis, and this is sure to shed additional light on the process of education finance 
reform.  Additional lawsuits are currently pending in several states, including Colorado, 
Nebraska, and South Dakota (Starting at 3 2007a); studying the outcomes of any reforms 
in these states will certainly add to the understanding of education finance reform.  Also 
of particular interest at this point is not just the initial impact of reform, but the long-term 
impact upon a state’s education finance system.  With this additional panel some states 
will have had reform for over 30 years, while others will have only recently implemented 
reform.  Does the impact of court-ordered reform change over time?  Graphs of the data 
in Chapter 3 indicate that perhaps the improvement in equality dissipates over time.  If 
this is the case, then such trends will be more apparent with additional data. 
 The detailed case study of education finance reform in Texas proved to be 
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particularly instructive in this project, and so it is my hope that I will be able to conduct 
similar case studies of other states.  Texas is an instance of a state that does not wish to 
pursue reform, and yet the courts continue to find the education finance system 
unconstitutional.  In most cases the Legislature responds by making minor changes to the 
system rather than implementing significant reforms.  Can these same patterns be found 
in other states or do they face a different set of circumstances?  I found it quite interesting 
that under the Robin Hood plan in Texas, only about 10 percent of school districts fall 
under the recapture provision which requires that some of their property tax revenue be 
redistributed, and yet this small number group of voters is vocal enough that they are able 
to cause a great deal of turmoil in the Legislature.  Why are the less wealthy in the state 
not able to force a redistribution from the wealthy to themselves, since they form a much 
larger bloc of voters?  Does this same puzzle appear in other states?  A better 
understanding of how legislatures respond to court-ordered reform will certainly help to 
explain why the data analysis shows a change in equality without a change in the level of 
education expenditures. 
 In any study that involves education, it is natural to ask how these reforms affect 
student achievement.  The goal of these lawsuits is to receive additional funding in order 
to improve the quality of education; is this aim achieved?  While it is difficult to measure 
student achievement, and even though many experts agree that additional money is not 
always the cure for schools with low performances, it does seem reasonable that any 
extra revenue for schools has the potential to raise student performance.  A study of test 
scores before and after court-ordered reform, particularly in those schools districts that 
benefited the most from changes in the education finance system, might give some idea 
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of whether student achievement is affected by these lawsuits.   
Certainly the hopes of those who bring these court cases is that they will bring 
benefits to the students of their school district and state.  The changes resulting from the 
court orders are complex, and so understanding the full implications of the resulting 
reforms is a process which requires careful analysis.  As the states continue to face these 
challenges and work to implement further changes, it will continue to be important to 
study the full implications of court-ordered education finance reform. 
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Appendix A 
Data Sources 
 
The complete citation for all of the sources listed below can be found in the 
Bibliography. 
 The inequality measures for the panels from 1972 to 1997 were graciously 
provided by the authors of Murray et al. (1998).  For the 2002 panel, the inequality 
measures were calculated using data from the 2002 Census of Governments by the U.S. 
Census Bureau which can be found at their website on “State and Local Government 
Finances” (2004).  In calculating the 2002 inequality measures, the techniques for editing 
and weighting data described by Murray et al. were followed, and the computation was 
done in Stata using a Stata Technical Bulletin for the analysis of income distributions 
written by Jenkins (2004). 
 Information on when education finance reform cases occurred in each state came 
primarily from the Murray et al. paper, as well as from the Advocacy Center for 
Children’s Educational Success with Standards (ACCESS) website (2005) which 
provides excellent information on the history of education reform in each state.  Other 
sources included the Education and Finance Accountability Program (2003), Hickrod et 
al. (1997), the National Center for Education Statistics (2003b), the National School 
Boards Association (2004), Starting at 3 (2007b), and Vinik (1996). 
 The state and local government price index that was used to deflate all money 
figures to 1992 dollars was from the National Income and Product Accounts Tables by 
the Bureau of Economic Analysis (2005).  The data on education expenditures and 
average daily attendance (ADA) numbers in each state were found in the “Digest of 
Education Statistics” by the National Center for Education Statistics (2003a).  Much of 
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the data on education expenditures, average daily attendance (ADA), and the size of age 
cohorts was collected by Gerber et al. (2000). 
 The dynamic ideology measure for each state is from Berry et al. (1998, 2004).  
The per capita income figures are from the Bureau of Economic Analysis, and can be 
found on their website under the section “Annual State Personal Income” (2004).  The 
data on the percent of teachers under collective bargaining agreements were kindly 
provided by Hoxby (2001) for the years 1972 to 1987.  For the years 1992 to 2002, the 
data were kindly provided by Terry Moe from the 1993-1994 and 1999-2000 School and 
Staffing Survey (SASS) by the National Center for Education Statistics (2000, 1994).  The 
states under federal preclearance supervision were taken from Ueda (2005) and the 
United States Department of Justice (2007).  The population figures for each state broken 
down by age categories is from the U.S. Census Bureau and can be found on their 
website under the section Population Estimates (2005).  Data on the percent of the 
population in each state this is black and Hispanic was also taken from the U.S. Census 
Bureau Population Estimates. 
Cornell Law School Legal Information Institute (2006) and Starting at 3 (2007a) 
were used to locate state constitutions and their education clauses (a table presenting all 
of these is available in Appendix B: State Constitution Education Clauses).  The data on 
justice ideology were kindly provided by Langer (2006).    Information on the judicial 
selection method used by each state, in order to determine which use partisan methods, is 
from the American Judicature Society (2006).  The indicator for those states which 
require a supermajority of justices to overturn the education finance system is from 
Caminker (2003).   
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The Chapter 5 data on unadjusted education revenue in the United States from 
1890 to 1930 are from Mort (1933, Tables 1 and 2), and the data for all years after 1930 
are taken from the Digest of Education Statistics by the United States Department of 
Education (2005, Table 152).  The data from Mort combines state and federal revenues 
for education, so those figures are listed under state revenues for the years 1890 to 1930.  
Missing years of data were estimated using interpolation.  The deflator used is the gross 
domestic product price index; the deflators from 1890 to 1925 are from EH.Net (2006), 
and the deflators for all years after 1925 are from the National Income and Product 
Accounts Table by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (2005).   
The data on the share of education revenues by source (state, local, federal) by 
state are take from the Digest of Education Statistics, years 1972, 1979, 1983–84, 1985–
86, 1989, 1994, 1999, and 2004.  The revenue shares for 1982 were calculated by 
averaging the shares for 1981 and 1983 because the data was not available for 1982. 
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Appendix B 
State Constitution Education Clauses 
 
 The table below lists the education clause in each state constitution, as well as its 
location in the document.  There is also a column noting the key words in each phrase 
which were used in order to determine the coding for the strength of the education clause, 
as listed in the final column. 
Table B.1 - State Constitution Education Clauses 
State 
Location 
of 
Education 
Clause 
Education Clause Keywords Clause Strength 
Alabama Art. XIV, § 256 
The legislature shall 
establish, organize, and 
maintain a liberal system 
of public schools 
throughout the state for 
the benefit of the children 
thereof between the ages 
of seven and twenty-one 
years.  
establish, 
organize, 
maintain, a 
liberal system 
Weak 
Alabama Amend. 111 
It is the policy of the state 
of Alabama to foster and 
promote the education of 
its citizens in a manner 
and extent consistent with 
its available resources, 
and the willingness and 
ability of the individual 
student, but nothing in 
this Constitution shall be 
construed as creating or 
recognizing any right to 
education or training at 
public expense, nor as 
limiting the authority and 
duty of the legislature, in 
furthering or providing 
for education, to require 
or impose conditions or 
no right to 
education at 
public expense 
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procedures deemed 
necessary to the 
preservation of peace and 
order. 
Alaska Art. 7, § 1 
The legislature shall by 
general law establish and 
maintain a system of 
public schools open to all 
children of the State, and 
may provide for other 
public educational 
institutions.  
establish and 
maintain a 
system 
Weak 
Arizona Art. 11, § 1A 
The legislature shall enact 
such laws as shall provide 
for the establishment and 
maintenance of a general 
and uniform public 
school system ... 
general and 
uniform Intermediate
Arkansas Art. 14, § 1
... the State shall ever 
maintain a general, 
suitable and efficient 
system of free public 
schools and shall adopt 
all suitable means to 
secure to the people the 
advantages and 
opportunities of education
general, 
suitable, and 
efficient; all 
suitable means 
Intermediate
California Art. 9, § 1 
A general diffusion of 
knowledge and 
intelligence being 
essential to the 
preservation of the rights 
and liberties of the 
people, the Legislature 
shall encourage by all 
suitable means ... 
encourage by 
all suitable 
means 
Weak 
California Art. 9, § 5 
The Legislature shall 
provide for a system of 
common schools by 
which a free school shall 
be kept up and supported 
in each district  
system of 
common 
schools 
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Colorado Art. IX, § 2 
The general assembly 
shall, as soon as 
practicable, provide for 
the establishment and 
maintenance of a 
thorough and uniform 
system of free public 
schools throughout the 
state ... 
thorough and 
uniform Intermediate
Connecticut Art. 8, § 1 
There shall always be free 
public elementary and 
secondary schools in the 
state. The general 
assembly shall implement 
this principle by 
appropriate legislation. 
free Weak 
Delaware Art. X, § 1 
The General Assembly 
shall provide for the 
establishment and 
maintenance of a general 
and efficient system of 
free public schools, and 
may require by law that 
every child, not 
physically or mentally 
disabled, shall attend the 
public school, unless 
educated by other means. 
general and 
efficient Intermediate
Florida old Art. IX, § 1 
... adequate provision 
shall be made by law for 
a uniform system of free 
public schools.. 
uniform Intermediate
Florida 
new Art. 
IX, § 1 
(passed 
1998) 
The education of children 
is a fundamental value of 
the people of the State of 
Florida. It is, therefore, a 
paramount duty of the 
state to make adequate 
provision for the 
education of all children 
residing within its 
borders. Adequate 
provision shall be made 
by law for a uniform, 
efficient, safe, secure, and 
high quality system of 
uniform, 
efficient, safe, 
secure, and 
high quality 
Strong 
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free public schools that 
allows students to obtain 
a high quality education 
and for the establishment, 
maintenance, and 
operation of institutions 
of higher learning and 
other public education 
programs that the needs 
of the people may 
require.  
Georgia old Art. VII, § 1 
The provision of an 
adequate education for 
the citizens shall be a 
primary obligation of the 
State of Georgia, the 
expense of which shall be 
provided for by taxation. 
adequate Weak 
Georgia 
new Art. 
VII, § 1 
(ratified 
1983) 
The provision of an 
adequate public education 
for the citizens shall be a 
primary obligation of the 
State of Georgia. Public 
education for the citizens 
prior to the college or 
postsecondary level shall 
be free and shall be 
provided for by taxation. 
The expense of other 
public education shall be 
provided for in such 
manner and in such 
amount as may be 
provided by law. 
adequate Weak 
Hawaii Art. X, § 1 
The State shall provide 
for the establishment, 
support and control of a 
statewide system of 
public schools  
establishment, 
support, and 
control of a 
statewide 
system 
Weak 
Idaho Art. IX, § 1 
... it shall be the duty of 
the legislature of Idaho, 
to establish and maintain 
a general, uniform and 
thorough system of 
public, free common 
schools. 
general, 
uniform, and 
thorough 
Intermediate
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Illinois Art. X, § 1 
The State shall provide 
for an efficient system of 
high quality public 
educational institutions 
and services.  
efficient, high 
quality Strong 
Indiana Art 8, § 1 
... provide, by law, for a 
general and uniform 
system of Common 
Schools, wherein tuition 
shall be without charge, 
and equally open to all. 
general and 
uniform Intermediate
Iowa Art. IX, § 3 
The general assembly 
shall encourage, by all 
suitable means, the 
promotion of intellectual, 
scientific, moral, and 
agricultural improvement. 
encourage, by 
all suitable 
means 
Weak 
Kansas Art. 6, § 1 
The legislature shall 
provide for intellectual, 
educational, vocational 
and scientific 
improvement by 
establishing and 
maintaining public 
schools ... 
shall establish 
and maintain Weak 
Kansas Art. 6, § 6 (b) 
The legislature shall 
make suitable provision 
for finance of the 
educational interests of 
the state.  
suitable 
provision  
Kentucky Section 183 
The General Assembly 
shall, by appropriate 
legislation, provide for an 
efficient system of 
common schools 
throughout the State.  
efficient Intermediate
Louisiana Art. VII, Preamble 
The goal of the public 
educational system is to 
provide learning 
environments and 
experiences, at all stages 
of human development, 
that are humane, just, and 
designed to promote 
excellence in order that 
every individual may be 
equal 
opportunity Intermediate
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afforded an equal 
opportunity to develop to 
his full potential. 
Louisiana Art. VII, § 1 
The legislature shall 
provide for the education 
of the people of the state 
and shall establish and 
maintain a public 
educational system. 
provide for, 
establish and 
maintain 
 
Louisiana Art. VII, § 13 (B) 
The legislature shall 
annually appropriate 
funds sufficient to fully 
fund the current cost to 
the state of such a 
program as determined by 
applying the approved 
formula in order to insure 
a minimum foundation of 
education in all public 
elementary and secondary 
schools. 
minimum 
foundation of 
education 
 
Maine Art. VIII, § 1 
the Legislature are 
authorized, and it shall be 
their duty to require, the 
several towns to make 
suitable provision, at their 
own expense, for the 
support and maintenance 
of public schools 
require the 
several towns 
to make 
suitable 
provision at 
their own 
expense 
Weak 
Maryland Art. VIII, § 1 
The General Assembly, at 
its First Session after the 
adoption of this 
Constitution, shall by 
Law establish throughout 
the State a thorough and 
efficient System of Free 
Public Schools; and shall 
provide by taxation, or 
otherwise, for their 
maintenance. 
thorough and 
efficient Intermediate
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Massachusetts Chapter V, Section II 
...it shall be the duty of 
legislatures and 
magistrates, in all future 
periods of this 
commonwealth, to 
cherish the interests of 
literature and the 
sciences, and all 
seminaries of them; 
especially the university 
at Cambridge, public 
schools and grammar 
schools in the towns... 
cherish Weak 
Michigan Art. VIII, § 2 
The legislature shall 
maintain and support a 
system of free public 
elementary and secondary 
schools as defined by 
law. Every school district 
shall provide for the 
education of its pupils 
without discrimination as 
to religion, creed, race, 
color or national origin. 
maintain and 
support; 
without 
discrimination 
Weak 
Minnesota Article VIII, § 1 
...it is the duty of the 
legislature to establish a 
general and uniform 
system of public schools. 
The legislature shall 
make such provisions by 
taxation or otherwise as 
will secure a thorough 
and efficient system of 
public schools throughout 
the state.  
general, 
uniform, 
thorough, and 
efficient 
Intermediate
Mississippi Article 8, Sec. 201 
The Legislature shall, by 
general law, provide for 
the establishment, 
maintenance and support 
of free public schools 
upon such conditions and 
limitations as the 
Legislature may 
prescribe. 
establishment, 
maintenance, 
and support 
Weak 
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Missouri Art. IX, § 1 (a) 
A general diffusion of 
knowledge and 
intelligence being 
essential to the 
preservation of the rights 
and liberties of the 
people, the general 
assembly shall establish 
and maintain free public 
schools for the gratuitous 
instruction of all persons 
in this state within ages 
not in excess of twenty-
one years as prescribed 
by law. 
establish and 
maintain Weak 
Missouri Art. III, § 36 
All appropriations of 
money by successive 
general assemblies shall 
be made in the following 
order: First: For payment 
of sinking fund and 
interest on outstanding 
obligations of the state. 
Second: For the purpose 
of public education.  
funds for 
public 
education 
appropriated 
second 
 
Montana Art. X, § 1 (1) 
It is the goal of the people 
to establish a system of 
education which will 
develop the full 
educational potential of 
each person. Equality of 
educational opportunity is 
guaranteed to each person 
of the state. 
equality of 
educational 
opportunity 
guaranteed 
Strong 
Montana Art. X, § 1 (3) 
The legislature shall 
provide a basic system of 
free quality public 
elementary and secondary 
schools. The legislature 
may provide such other 
educational institutions, 
public libraries, and 
educational programs as 
it deems desirable. It shall 
fund and distribute in an 
equitable manner to the 
basic system, 
quality, 
distribute in an 
equitable 
manner 
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school districts the state's 
share of the cost of the 
basic elementary and 
secondary school system. 
Nebraska Art. VII, sec. 1 
The Legislature shall 
provide for the free 
instruction in the 
common schools of this 
state of all persons 
between the ages of five 
and twenty-one years.  
free 
instruction Weak 
Nevada Art. 11, § 2
The legislature shall 
provide for a uniform 
system of common 
schools, by which a 
school shall be 
established and 
maintained in each school 
district ... 
uniform Intermediate
New 
Hampshire Art. 83 
...it shall be the duty of 
the legislators and 
magistrates, in all future 
periods of this 
government, to cherish 
the interest of literature 
and the sciences, and all 
seminaries and public 
schools... 
cherish Weak 
New Jersey Art. VIII, sec. IV 
The Legislature shall 
provide for the 
maintenance and support 
of a thorough and 
efficient system of free 
public schools for the 
instruction of all the 
children in the State 
between the ages of five 
and eighteen years. 
thorough and 
efficient Intermediate
New Mexico Art. XII, § 1 
A uniform system of free 
public schools sufficient 
for the education of, and 
open to, all the children 
of school age in the state 
shall be established and 
maintained.  
uniform Intermediate
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New York Art. XI, § 1 
The legislature shall 
provide for the 
maintenance and support 
of a system of free 
common schools, wherein 
all the children of this 
state may be educated. 
maintenance 
and support Weak 
North 
Carolina 
Art. IX, § 
2 (1) 
The people have a right to 
the privilege of education, 
and it is the duty of the 
State to guard and 
maintain that right. 
right to the 
privilege of 
education 
Strong 
North 
Carolina   
The General Assembly 
shall provide by taxation 
and otherwise for a 
general and uniform 
system of free public 
schools, which shall be 
maintained at least nine 
months in every year, and 
wherein equal 
opportunities shall be 
provided for all students. 
general and 
uniform, equal 
opportunities 
shall be 
provided for 
all students 
 
North Dakota Art. VII, § 1 
..., the legislative 
assembly shall make 
provision for the 
establishment and 
maintenance of a system 
of public schools which 
shall be open to all 
children of the state of 
North Dakota... 
establishment 
and 
maintenance 
Weak 
North Dakota Art. VII, § 2 
The legislative assembly 
shall provide for a 
uniform system of free 
public schools throughout 
the state ... 
uniform  
Ohio Art. 6, § 2 
The General Assembly 
shall make such 
provisions, by taxation, or 
otherwise, as, with the 
income arising from the 
school trust fund, will 
secure a thorough and 
efficient system of 
common schools 
thorough and 
efficient Intermediate
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throughout the state ... 
Oklahoma Art. XII, § 1 
The Legislature shall 
establish and maintain a 
system of free public 
schools wherein all the 
children of the State may 
be educated. 
establish and 
maintain Weak 
Oregon Art. VIII, § 3 
The Legislative Assembly 
shall provide by law for 
the establishment of a 
uniform, and general 
system of Common 
schools. 
uniform and 
general Intermediate
Pennsylvania Art. III, B § 14 
The General Assembly 
shall provide for the 
maintenance and support 
of a thorough and 
efficient system of public 
education to serve the 
needs of the 
Commonwealth. 
thorough and 
efficient Intermediate
Rhode Island Art. XII, § 1 
The diffusion of 
knowledge, as well as of 
virtue among the people, 
being essential to the 
preservation of their 
rights and liberties, it 
shall be the duty of the 
general assembly to 
promote public schools 
and public libraries, and 
to adopt all means which 
it may deem necessary 
and proper to secure to 
the people the advantages 
and opportunities of 
education and public 
library services. 
promote, adopt 
all means ... to 
secure 
Intermediate
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South 
Carolina 
Art. XI, § 
3 
The General Assembly 
shall provide for the 
maintenance and support 
of a system of free public 
schools open to all 
children in the State and 
shall establish, organize 
and support such other 
public institutions of 
learning, as may be 
desirable. 
maintenance 
and support Weak 
South Dakota Art. VIII, § 1 
The stability of a 
republican form of 
government depending on 
the morality and 
intelligence of the people, 
it shall be the duty of the 
Legislature to establish 
and maintain a general 
and uniform system of 
public schools wherein 
tuition shall be without 
charge, and equally open 
to all; and to adopt all 
suitable means to secure 
to the people the 
advantages and 
opportunities of education
general and 
uniform; adopt 
all suitable 
means to 
secure ... the 
advantages 
and 
opportunities 
of education 
Strong 
South Dakota Art. VIII, § 15 
The Legislature shall 
make such provision by 
general taxation and by 
authorizing the school 
corporations to levy such 
additional taxes as with 
the income from the 
permanent school fund 
shall secure a thorough 
and efficient system of 
common schools 
throughout the state. 
thorough and 
efficient  
Tennessee Art. XI, § 12 
The State of Tennessee 
recognizes the inherent 
value of education and 
encourages its support. 
The General Assembly 
shall provide for the 
maintenance, 
support, and 
eligibility 
standards 
Weak 
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maintenance, support and 
eligibility standards of a 
system of free public 
schools.  
Texas Art. 7, § 1 
A general diffusion of 
knowledge being 
essential to the 
preservation of the 
liberties and rights of the 
people, it shall be the 
duty of the Legislature of 
the State to establish and 
make suitable provision 
for the support and 
maintenance of an 
efficient system of public 
free schools. 
efficient Intermediate
Utah Art. X, § 1 
The Legislature shall 
provide for the 
establishment and 
maintenance of the state's 
education systems 
including: (a) a public 
education system, which 
shall be open to all 
children of the state; and 
(b) a higher education 
system. Both systems 
shall be free from 
sectarian control. 
establishment 
and 
maintenance 
Weak 
Vermont Chap. II, § 68 
Laws for the 
encouragement of virtue 
and prevention of vice 
and immorality ought to 
be constantly kept in 
force, and duly executed; 
and a competent number 
of schools ought to be 
maintained in each town 
unless the general 
assembly permits other 
provisions for the 
convenient instruction of 
youth.  
competent 
number of 
schools ought 
to be 
maintained in 
each town 
Weak 
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Virginia Art. VII, § 1 
The General Assembly 
shall provide for a system 
of free public elementary 
and secondary schools for 
all children of school age 
throughout the 
Commonwealth, and shall 
seek to ensure that an 
educational program of 
high quality is established 
and continually 
maintained. 
high quality Strong 
Washington Art. IX, § 1 
It is the paramount duty 
of the state to make 
ample provision for the 
education of all children 
residing within its 
borders, without 
distinction or preference 
on account of race, color, 
caste, or sex.  
paramount 
duty Strong 
Washington Art. IX, § 2 
The legislature shall 
provide for a general and 
uniform system of public 
schools.  
general and 
uniform  
West Virginia Art. XII, § 1 
The Legislature shall 
provide, by general law, 
for a thorough and 
efficient system of free 
schools. 
thorough and 
efficient Intermediate
Wisconsin Art. X, § 3 
The legislature shall 
provide by law for the 
establishment of district 
schools, which shall be as 
nearly uniform as 
practicable; 
as nearly 
uniform as 
practicable 
Intermediate
Wyoming 97-1-023 
The right of the citizens 
to opportunities for 
education should have 
practical recognition. The 
legislature shall suitably 
encourage means and 
agencies calculated to 
advance the sciences and 
liberal arts. 
practical 
recognition, 
suitably 
encourage 
Intermediate
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Wyoming 97-7-001 
The legislature shall 
provide for the 
establishment and 
maintenance of a 
complete and uniform 
system of public 
instruction, embracing 
free elementary schools 
of every needed kind and 
grade,  
complete and 
uniform  
Wyoming 97-7-009 
The legislature shall 
make such further 
provision by taxation or 
otherwise, as with the 
income arising from the 
general school fund will 
create and maintain a 
thorough and efficient 
system of public schools, 
adequate to the proper 
instruction of all youth of 
the state, between the 
ages of six and twenty-
one years, free of charge; 
thorough and 
efficient  
Wyoming 97-21-028 
The legislature shall 
make laws for the 
establishment and 
maintenance of systems 
of public schools which 
shall be open to all the 
children of the state and 
free from sectarian 
control. 
establishment 
and 
maintenance 
 
 
 
 
